Essays on Mental Accounting and Consumers\u27 Decision Making by Besharat, Ali
University of South Florida
Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School
January 2012
Essays on Mental Accounting and Consumers'
Decision Making
Ali Besharat
University of South Florida, abeshara@usf.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the American Studies Commons, Cognitive Psychology Commons, and the Marketing
Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Scholar Commons Citation
Besharat, Ali, "Essays on Mental Accounting and Consumers' Decision Making" (2012). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/3977
  
 
 
 
 
 
Essays on Mental Accounting and Consumers’ Decision Making 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Ali Besharat 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
 of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Marketing 
College of Business 
University of South Florida 
 
 
 
Major Professor: Sajeev Varki, Ph.D. 
Anand Kumar, Ph.D. 
Barbara Lafferty, Ph.D. 
Dan Bradley, Ph.D. 
 
 
Date of Approval: 
May 29, 2012 
 
 
 
Keywords: Debt Management, Credit Card Debt, Prepayment, Time, Effort 
 
Copyright © 2012, Ali Besharat
  
 
 
 
 
Dedication 
 
I have truly lived a blessed life filled with many loving and supportive people. 
This dissertation is dedicated to the lovely people who shared with me the effort and 
sacrifices required to complete it.  
First, I dedicate this work to my immediate family: my parents, Mehdi and 
Shokouh, and my sister, Nasim, for their endless love, support, sacrifice, and patience 
throughout my life. I could not have accomplished this without you.  
Second, I dedicate this dissertation to my girlfriend, Andrea Doty, who is the love 
of my life, my strength, and support. You always expressed interest and pride in my 
endeavors and without you this journey might not have been successful. 
Finally, I dedicate this dissertation to my mentors, Dr. Sajeev Varki, Dr. Anand 
Kumar, Dr. Stock, and Dr. Ortinau, who believed in me, encouraged me to have 
confidence in myself, pushed me to think and write more scholarly, and supported my 
intellectual growth. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
I owe thanks to many people, whose assistance was indispensable in completing 
this project. It would not have been possible to write this doctoral dissertation without the 
help and support of the kind people around me, to only some of whom it is possible to 
give particular mention here.  
Above all, I would like to thank Dr. Sajeev Varki, advisor and dissertation chair, 
for his thoroughness and promptness in reviewing my work in progress, even when it 
involved considerable discomfort and inconvenience on his part. Without his ongoing 
feedback, it would have been impossible to maintain the standard of scholarship that this 
project required.  
I am also very grateful to Dr. Anand Kumar who has helped me develop a taste 
for high quality research, guided me through research projects from idea to execution, 
and shaped my research and teaching philosophy. 
Special thanks to my other dissertation committee members, Dr. Lafferty and Dr. 
Bradley, who graciously served on my dissertation committee. They were always 
supportive of my work and were willing to help and provide insightful feedback.  
Finally, there are various faculty, PhD students, and staff at USF who have helped 
me – both professionally and personally - along the way. I thank everyone listed above. I 
could not have done this without you.
i 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Tables  iv 
 
List of Figures  v 
 
Abstract  vi 
 
Essay 1: Managing the Cost of Multiple Debt Accounts: A Behavioral Perspective 1 
1.1 Overview 1 
1.2 Introduction 2 
1.3 Literature Review 5 
1.4 The Smallest Balance with the Lowest APR is Paid First 6 
1.5 Debt Repayment: The Timing and Nature of Debt 10 
1.6 Does the Number of Credit Cards Matter? 12 
1.7 Debt Management and the Source of Income 13 
1.8 Why Does This Effect Occur? 16 
1.9 Overview of the Studies 17 
1.10 Experiment 1 19 
1.10.1 Pretest 20 
1.10.2 Design, participants, and procedure 21 
1.10.3 Independent variables 23 
1.10.3.1 Smallest debt APR 23 
1.10.3.2 Income level 23 
1.10.4 Dependent variables 23 
1.10.5 Covariates 24 
1.10.6 Results 25  
1.10.6.1 Manipulation check 25 
1.10.6.2 Support for H1 25 
1.10.7 Discussion 27 
1.11 Experiment 2 28 
1.11.1 Pretests 29 
1.11.2 Design, participants, and procedures 30 
1.11.3 Independent variables 31 
1.11.3.1 Nature of debt 31 
1.11.3.2 Timing of the consumption benefits 32 
1.11.4 Dependent variable 32 
1.11.5 Covariates 32 
1.11.6 Results 33 
1.11.6.1 Manipulation check 33 
1.11.6.2 Support for H2a and H2b 33 
ii 
 
1.11.7 Discussion 34 
1.12 Experiment 3 37 
1.12.1 Design, participants, and procedure 38 
1.12.2 Independent variables 39 
1.12.2.1 Number of credit cards 39 
1.12.2.2 Type of allocated income 40 
1.12.3 Dependent variable 40 
1.12.4 Process evidence 40 
1.12.5 Covariates 41 
1.12.6 Results 42 
1.12.6.1 Manipulation check 42 
1.12.6.2 Support for H3 42 
1.12.6.3 Support for H4a and H4b 43 
1.12.6.4 Process evidence 45 
1.12.7 Discussion 46 
1.13 General Discussion and Conclusion 48 
1.13.1 Theoretical implications 49 
1.13.2 Public policy implications 50 
1.13.3 Managerial implications 51 
1.13.4 Directions for future research 52 
1.13.5 Limitations 54 
1.14 References 55 
 
Essay 2: Saving by Overspending 62 
2.1 Overview 62 
2.2 Introduction 63 
2.3 Monetary Prepayment Violates Self-control 68 
2.4 Prepayment Currencies and Loss of Self-control 73 
2.5 Why Do These Effects Occur? 77 
2.6 Overview of Studies 79 
2.7 Experiment 1 81 
2.7.1 Design, participants, and procedure 81 
2.7.2 Independent variables 83 
2.7.2.1 Prepayment 83 
2.7.2.2 Consumption avoidance goal 84 
2.7.3 Dependent variables 84 
2.7.3.1 Choice of snack 84 
2.7.3.2 Willingness to pay 85 
2.7.4 Process evidence 85 
2.7.5 Covariates 86 
2.7.6 Results 87 
2.7.6.1 Manipulation check 87 
2.7.6.2 Support for H1 and H2 87 
2.7.6.3 Process evidence 91 
2.7.7 Discussion 93 
2.8 Experiment 2 94 
iii 
 
2.8.1 Pretests 95 
2.8.2 Design, participants, and procedure 96 
2.8.3 Independent variables 98 
2.8.3.1 Prepayment currency 98 
2.8.3.2 Prepayment anticipation 99 
2.8.4 Dependent variable 99 
2.8.5 Process evidence 100 
2.8.6 Covariates 100 
2.8.7 Results 101 
2.8.7.1 Manipulation check 101 
2.8.7.2 Choice of appetizers 101 
2.8.7.3 Process evidence 104 
2.8.8 Discussion 105 
2.9 General Discussion and Conclusion 106 
2.9.1 Theoretical implications 108 
2.9.2 Managerial implications 109 
2.9.3 Directions for future research 111 
2.9.4 Limitations 112 
2.10 References 113 
 
Appendices  122 
Appendix A: Extra Tables 122 
Appendix B: Scales/Measures 131  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: The results of three regression models for testing the mediated 
moderation 47  
  
Table A1: Proportion of budget allocated to debt with the smaller balance under 
different APR levels and budget limits 122 
 
Table A2: Pretest results for vehicle package evaluation 123 
 
Table A3: Proportion of budget allocated to the smaller balance when the nature 
and the timing of debt vary 124 
 
Table A4: Proportion of budget allocated to debt with the smaller balance under 
different types of income and number of credit cards 125 
 
Table A5: Pretest results for snack choices 126 
 
Table A6: Average amount of money people are willing to pay for their snack 
based on the existence of prepayment and consumption avoidance goal 127 
 
Table A7: Proportion of unhealthy snacks based on the existence of prepayment 
and consumption avoidance goal 128 
 
Table A8: Proportion of health-related, sunk cost-related and pleasure-related 
thoughts across the prepayment and avoidance goal conditions 129 
 
Table A9: Proportion of unhealthy appetizers under anticipation and different 
types of prepayment 130  
 
 
v 
 
 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: The influence of income and the interest rate on the proportion of 
income allocated to debt with the smaller balance and the lower APR 26 
 
Figure 2: The influence of the purpose of debt and consumption benefits on the 
proportion of income allocated to debt with the smaller balance and the 
lower APR 35 
 
Figure 3: The influence of the number of credit cards and the type of income on 
the proportion of income allocated to debt with the smallest balance and 
the lowest APR 44 
 
Figure 4: The influence of prepayment and avoidance goal on willingness to 
spend on a snack 89 
 
Figure 5: The influence of prepayment and avoidance goal on preference for an 
unhealthy snack 90 
 
Figure 6: The influence of prepayment currency and anticipation on preference 
for an unhealthy appetizer 103 
 
vi 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation is structured in the form of two empirical essays, each 
investigating one type of irrational decision caused by mental accounting. The first essay, 
titled “Managing the Cost of Multiple Debt Accounts: A Behavioral Perspective”, 
explores why many people pay off credit cards’ with the lowest rate first when rationally 
speaking they should repay the debt with the highest rate most quickly. This essay 
suggests that irrationality emerges when people seek to close ‘mental accounts’ 
associated with their credit cards and reduce the total number of outstanding loans rather 
than decrease the amount of total debt among all credit cards. Consumers want to be debt 
free. If they can get rid of debt, on even one credit card, they feel a sense of 
accomplishment which psychologically helps them manage remainder of their debt 
better. The second essay, titled “Saving by Overspending”, explores consumers’ over-
expenditure and indulgent consumption when they make prepayments in the form of 
time, effort, or money toward a consumption goal. This essay proposes that people 
subconsciously try to get their prepayments’ worth, but in fact they may be spending their 
money irrationally. In addition, contrary to common knowledge, this essay suggests that 
when a prepayment is unanticipated, the loss of self-control is often more prominent 
when prepayments are made with behavioral resources (e.g., time or effort) than 
equivalent monetary resources.
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Essay 1: 
Managing the Cost of Multiple Debt Accounts: A Behavioral Perspective 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
This essay, employing three experiments, suggests that customers who own  
multiple credit cards may irrationally pay off the debt with the lowest interest first instead 
of paying off the debt with the highest interest. The first experiment confirms that 
individuals have a tendency to allocate their income toward the debt with the smallest 
balance and the lowest APR when they can pay off the entire or a major portion of the 
balance. The second experiment determines that debt repayment decisions are influenced 
by the nature of the debt (hedonic vs. utilitarian) and the timing of consumption benefits 
(past vs. future). That is, when consumption benefits occurred in the past (future), 
individuals were more willing to pay off the debt with the smallest balance and the lowest 
APR when it was associated with hedonic (utilitarian) rather than utilitarian (hedonic) 
consumption. Finally, our final experiment reveals that debtors tend to pay their debt 
more rationally when the number of debt accounts is increased or savings as opposed to 
other types of income such as windfall or reward-based are used toward the debt 
payment. Individuals’ motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts is shown to be 
the underlying mechanism for our findings. 
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1.2 Introduction  
 
Credit cards play an important role in consumer finances, especially in the current 
economic downturn where most customers have liquidity constraints. The convenience of 
use and the instant access to money are two reasons why a credit card is an attractive 
method of payment for both offline (e.g., in store) and e-commerce transactions. As the 
number of credit card transactions has radically increased in recent years, so has the 
credit card debt of consumers. Many consumers struggle to fully pay off their credit card 
balances each month and they revolve debt (e.g., the growth of debt when consumers’ 
rate of repayment slows). Recent credit card statistics report that 56% of the United 
States population carries a balance equal to $801 billion (Federal Reserve Report, 2012). 
The debt repayment decision becomes even more complex when consumers own multiple 
credit cards. For instance, industry reports indicate that American customers, on average, 
have five credit cards and the average balance per open credit card is $1,157 (Credit Card 
Report, 2012). 
Classic principles of economics suggest that consumers are rational and they 
should repay the debt with the highest rate most quickly. However, evidence from the 
behavioral finance literature indicates that individuals do not always employ normative 
principles in debt management (Navarro-Martinez, Salisbury, Lemon, Stewart, Matthews, 
and Harris, 2011; Amar, Ariely, Ayal, Cryder, and Rick, 2011). For instance, Navarro-
Martinez et al. (2011) find that presenting the minimum required payment information 
and disclosing supplemental debt information have no significant impact on debt 
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repayment decisions. Amar et al. (2011) indicate that individuals often make suboptimal 
financial decision in the form of debt account aversion. That is, debtors manage a debt 
portfolio by allocating most of their budget toward their small debt balances. When 
individuals were not able to pay off their smallest balance, however, their attention was 
drawn more to the financial costs of their debt accounts.  
This paper extends the stream of research on the psychology of debt payment by 
investigating how people manage multiple credit card debt and how they prioritize their 
debt repayment. In particular, we demonstrate that people under certain circumstances 
may mismanage their credit card debt, ultimately delaying their ability to become debt 
free. Loan borrowers’ motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts underlies the 
intention to pay off the debt with the smallest balance and the lowest APR (i.e., the least 
expensive loan). We propose that the negative thoughts of payment caused by the 
segregation of debt (e.g., segregated losses) create a psychological burden that eventually 
leads borrowers toward reducing the number of debt accounts, regardless of their interest 
rates (APR). In the case of multiple debt accounts, when the complexity of debt is 
reduced, individuals perceive a sense of psychological progress (Amar et al., 2011). The 
perception of progress toward a goal has been shown to work as a self-imposed 
psychological reward (Kivetz et al., 2006) and this may help borrowers to better deal with 
the remainder of their debt accounts.  
We suggest that the complexity of debt management in the case of multiple credit 
cards may cause debtors to behave irrationally by paying off the smallest debt with the 
lowest APR first. For example, a person with a $300 loan with a 6% interest rate and a 
$3,000 loan with 12% interest may decide to pay off the $300 loan with their first 
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paycheck, rather than the $3,000 loan. Therefore, customers with multiple credit card 
debts tend to reduce the number of debt accounts rather than to decrease the total cost of 
debt across all accounts. This notion is supported by research that finds that consumers 
discount future interests rates (Stango and Zinman, 2009) and underestimate the 
exponential growth of interest compounding (McKenzie and Liersch, 2011), especially 
when they are not obligated to pay off their debt within a certain period. Although 
eliminating one of the debt accounts may give consumers an impression of progress 
toward the end goal (e.g., becoming debt free) and may offer short-term psychological 
benefits, this behavior costs borrowers in the long run by delaying their ability to become 
debt free.  
In addition, this paper examines the role of additional factors such as the purpose 
of the debt (e.g., whether the loan is used for hedonic or utilitarian consumption), the 
timing of the debt benefits (e.g., whether the benefits of the loan are realized in the past 
or future), the number of credit cards, and the source of income used to pay off the debt 
(e.g., savings, reward-based, or windfall) on credit card debt management. The topic of 
the current research is relevant not only to consumer researchers and policy makers trying 
to help consumers repay debt more efficiently, but to lenders as well, as they assess the 
average time for their loans to be repaid based on the credit portfolios of borrowers. 
We begin this paper with a review of the relevant literature and use this 
information to formulate our hypotheses. Then, we report three experiments that examine 
these hypotheses. Finally, we conclude with a general discussion of the results and 
various theoretical, public policy, and managerial implications of our findings. 
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1.3 Literature Review  
 
Mental accounting is a type of framing in which individuals form psychological 
accounts for the costs and benefits associated with their choices (Thaler, 1980). These 
accounts will remain open until a consumer has completed a transaction and obtained the 
consumption benefits (Thaler, 1985). Mental accounting helps people monitor their 
financial activities and regulate their consumption (Read, Loewenstein, and 
Kalyanaraman, 1999). Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) express the reciprocal interaction 
between the pleasure of consumption and the pain of payment (also known as 
“coupling”). Depending upon whether the positive utility of consumption surpasses the 
negative utility of payment, a consumer may evaluate the overall experience as pleasure 
(e.g., labeled “black”) or pain (e.g., labeled “red”). 
When people make a payment, they feel the pain of the incurred cost that may 
mitigate the positive feelings associated with future consumption. Similarly, the pleasure 
derived from consumption may be reduced when negative thoughts of the future payment 
are primed (Gourville and Soman, 1998; Siemens, 2007). “Sunk cost effect” is defined as 
individuals’ commitment to attain a planned decision when they have already devoted 
resources to its attainment (Thaler, 1985).  When payment becomes decoupled from 
consumption benefits, the sunk cost effect of payment is reduced (Soman and Gourville, 
2001). There are two ways that temporal separation (i.e., decoupling) of transaction costs 
and benefits may occur. First, it is possible that an individual pays for an item temporally 
prior to the consumption. Gourville and Soman (1998) propose that when a payment 
precedes benefits in a transaction, individuals pay more attention to the sunk costs. 
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However, this sunk cost effect disappears as time passes. The diminishing sunk cost 
effect over time is referred to as “payment depreciation.” Gourville and Soman (1998) 
found that people who paid for an annual gym membership in advance were less likely to 
use the gym facilities with the passage of time compared to those who paid monthly gym 
memberships.  
Additionally, it is likely that a reverse process to payment depreciation may take 
place in which consumption benefits occur before investment costs. Gourville and Soman 
(1998) refer to this process as “benefit depreciation.” In this case, a consumer uses the 
product before making the payment. They propose that the hedonic impact of the benefit 
depreciates over time such that the future payment feels more like a pure loss. The use of 
credit cards is one of the prevalent methods for the decoupling of consumption benefits 
from the disutility of payment. This happens as consumers typically experience the 
consumption benefits prior to the billing cycle. 
 
1.4 The Smallest Balance with the Lowest APR is Paid First 
 
A majority of credit card users own multiple credit cards (Rysman, 2007) and 
almost half of them are mired in credit card debt (Bertaut, Haliassos, and Reiter, 2009). 
Evidence from the behavioral finance literature finds that individuals often deviate from 
normative principles in debt management and behave irrationally (Navarro-Martinez et 
al., 2011; Stango and Zinman, 2009). This paper proposes that borrowers with multiple 
credit card debt tend to simplify their debt management task by reducing the total number 
of credit cards instead of focusing on the goal of reducing the total cost of their debt (i.e., 
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paying the debt with the highest APR first). For example, a person with a $500 debt and 
10% APR and a $1,000 debt with a 15% APR may decide to pay off the $500 loan (i.e. 
the least expensive debt to keep) first within the parameters of a constrained budget to 
eliminate one of the debt accounts. This decision provides debtors a feeling of 
accomplishment and positive progress toward total debt repayment. 
Several theories could explain this irrational behavior in multiple credit cards debt 
management. First, payment is painful, especially when it is decoupled from consumption 
(Thaler, 1985; Gourville and Soman, 1998). When a consumer uses a credit card, the 
consumption benefits are typically decoupled from the cost of the payment as the 
consumption is experienced before the payment (Gourville and Soman, 1998). Therefore, 
credit card debt, which is also referred to as debt account, represents a potential loss at 
the time of payment because most of the benefits are depreciated in the past (Soman, 
2001). When the number of debt accounts increases, the cost of debt becomes more 
salient as the disutility of segregated losses exceeds the disutility of aggregated losses 
(Kim, 2006; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Renewable resources theory (Linville and 
Fischer, 1991) posits that individuals have limited, but naturally renewable, loss buffering 
resources that are used to attenuate the aversive impact of negative events. When credit 
card users encounter multiple losses at the same time, the psychological burden of 
handling multiple losses requires borrowers to use a loss buffering (e.g., coping) 
mechanism to offset some of the pain associated with the immediate perceived losses 
(Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeister, 2001). Debt borrowers can partially discount the 
negative utility of the total debt by adding a psychological gain to it. In the case of 
multiple revolving accounts, reducing the debt on one of the revolving credit cards can 
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serve as a self-imposed psychological reward. Brenner, Rottenstreich, Sood, and Bilgin 
(2007) define possession loss aversion and assert that parting with a negative possession 
(i.e., an undesirable item such as debt) is a positive change and evokes pleasure. Hence, it 
is more desirable for people to change their status quo (e.g., eliminate one of the 
revolving balances) to experience the exaggerated “relief” from getting rid of an 
undesirable possession (i.e., a self-imposed reward system). 
Additionally, people tend to divide an ongoing goal into many constituent sub-
goals to monitor their actual actions (Fishbach and Shah, 2006). Particularly, when a 
superordinate goal is perceived to be difficult, people often try to attain the intended task 
by splitting it into smaller, more manageable parts (Newell and Simon, 1972). For 
example, people who want to stay in shape may pursue this goal via eating healthy, 
dieting, and exercising. Research indicates that the focus on sub-goal attainment inhibits 
the relationship between sub-goals and a superordinate goal. The reason is that sub-goal 
attainment creates a sense of accomplishment that justifies temporary disengagement 
from the superordinate goal (Fishbach and Dhar, 2005). Moreover, actions that are 
scheduled in the distant future are represented in more abstract terms, whereas decisions 
made for the proximal future are represented in more concrete forms (Trope and 
Liberman, 2003). The pursuit of sub-goals in the distant future is like focusing on a 
commitment to a superordinate goal and the pursuit of sub-goals in the proximal future is 
akin to focusing on sub-goal attainment (Fishbach and Shah, 2006). In the context of 
multiple credit cards debt management, a superordinate goal is to become completely 
debt free, while a sub-goal is to pay each credit card debt separately. Since borrowers 
owe many credit cards and they have limited financial resources, paying off multiple 
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debts is perceived to be difficult. Hence, borrowers may decide to break the intended task 
into smaller, more manageable sub-goals, each focused on paying off an individual debt. 
Meanwhile, debt revolvers visualize closing their mental accounts (e.g., being debt free) 
in the distant future, but closing mental accounts linked to a credit card debt in the 
proximal future. Therefore, they pursue this sub-goal because it is more achievable and 
justifiable in the short run, but it diminishes their motivation to attain their superordinate 
goal, which is to become debt free (Amir and Ariely, 2008; Fishbach and Shah, 2006). 
Finally, consumers regularly calculate their relative distance to a goal (Simonson 
and Tversky, 1992) and compare it with a certain criterion (e.g., paying off the debt). 
When their rate of progress satisfies this criterion, they experience positive affects 
(Carver and Scheier, 1990). The goal-gradient hypothesis denotes the actual or the 
illusion of progress toward a goal increases effort acceleration. It proposes that customers 
accelerate and persist in their efforts as they approach a program’s reward requirement 
(Kivetz et al., 2006). For instance, customers who had a café reward program increased 
their coffee purchases as they progressed toward earning a free coffee. When facing 
multiple debts on various credit cards, consumers may measure their distance to their 
ultimate goal and, subsequently, repay their debt in a manner that gives them an 
impression of progress toward the desired goal. Paying off individual loans rather than 
managing the overall deb account could evoke the perception of progress as it is easier to 
attain a smaller goal than a big goal. 
Based upon the aforementioned theories, this research proposes that credit card 
users mitigate the negative thoughts of debt payments by reducing the number of their 
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credit cards. This results in paying off the smallest balance with the lowest APR and runs 
counter to rational considerations. 
 
H1: People allocate most of their budget toward the debt with the smaller 
balance and the lower APR when their budget meets (or is considerably 
close to) the smaller balance. 
 
1.5 Debt Repayment: The Timing and the Nature of Debt 
 
Research suggests that people are debt averse and they want to pay off debt that 
does not provide any further benefits (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998). Gourville and 
Soman (1998) refer to this process as “benefit depreciation.” That is, when the 
consumption benefit depreciates over time, payment feels more like a pure loss. When 
people feel there is no future consumption benefits associated with a product acquired 
with a loan, they do not want to deal with the hassle of future payments. Hence, a 
consumer’s payment decision will depend upon the timing of future benefits. If 
consumers have loans for which the benefits have already been realized, they tend to pay 
them off with high priority (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998).  
In addition to the timing of the debt, the purpose of the debt may also influence 
the way people pay off their debt. Loans may be borrowed for either utilitarian or hedonic 
purposes. Utilitarian consumption provides consumers with functional benefits that are 
necessary and useful, whereas hedonic consumption is associated with fun and pleasure 
(Mishra and Mishra, 2011). Kivetz and Simonson (2002) demonstrate that the pain of 
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payment is more pronounced for hedonic consumption (e.g., vacation) than for utilitarian 
consumption (e.g., insurance) because, by definition, hedonic consumption is not 
essential and is more difficult to justify. Also, hedonic consumption is considered 
wasteful and may evoke guilt (Chen, Kalra, and Sun, 2009). Research shows that people 
quickly adapt to enjoyable consumption (e.g., consuming one’s preferred ice cream) 
because hedonic experiences depreciate more quickly than utilitarian experiences 
(Kahneman and Snell, 1990;Wang, Novemsky, and Dhar, 2009). Therefore, this paper 
hypothesizes that people are more willing to pay off debt associated with hedonic 
consumption than utilitarian consumption when the consumption benefits have been 
realized in the past. 
 
H2a: People allocate most of their budget toward the debt with the 
smaller balance when it is associated with past hedonic consumption than 
when it is associated with past utilitarian consumption. 
 
Conversely, thinking about future hedonic consumption is more enjoyable than 
utilitarian consumption (Nowlis, Mandel, and McCabe, 2004). Due to the emotional 
attachment to hedonic consumption, people anticipate more enjoyment and satisfaction 
from using hedonic rather than utilitarian products in the future (Shiv and Huber, 2000). 
Similarly, Caplin and Leahy (2001) indicated  that the expectation from future hedonic 
consumption has an additional positive impact on the overall evaluation of consumption. 
Loewenstein (1987) finds that people are willing to pay a greater amount of money if 
they receive a kiss from a movie star three days in the future instead of immediately. In 
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another study, Nowlis et al. (2004) report that people who wait to consume a chocolate 
bar for an unknown period of time enjoy the consumption more than people who 
consume it immediately. Since the anticipation of hedonic consumption in the future 
gives people pleasure, they will be reluctant to ruin their mood by making a payment. 
Soman and Gourville (2001) indicate that, ideally, consumption should be decoupled 
from payment so that it does not evoke negative feelings about the payment. Hence, this 
paper proposes that people are more willing to pay off debt associated with utilitarian 
consumption rather than hedonic consumption when the consumption benefits are 
expected in the future. 
 
H2b: People allocate most of their budget toward the debt with the 
smaller balance when it is associated with future utilitarian consumption 
than when it is associated with future hedonic consumption. 
 
1.6 Does the Number of Credit Cards Matter? 
 
The value function in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) is defined 
as deviation from a reference point and is generally steeper in the loss domain than in the 
gain domain. This theory implies that the overall subjective utility from segregated gains 
is less than one aggregated gain, whereas the overall subjective disutility from segregated 
losses is more than one aggregated loss (Hsee, Hastie, and Chen, 2008). Therefore, 
prospect theory suggests that consumers would be motivated to reduce the number of 
debt accounts immediately to reduce the total cost of mental accounting. This theory also 
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reports that the value function in the domain of losses is steepest near zero and gradually 
becomes flatter when the number of losses increases (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). For 
example, the marginal utility (e.g., the relative reduction in the pain of payment) gained 
from reducing the number of debt accounts from two to one is significantly more than 
reducing the number of segregated debts from five to four. In other words, when the 
number of mental accounts increases, closing one of them would not give rise to enough 
noticeable psychological gain (e.g., positive emotions evoked from a reduction in the 
pain of total loss) for people to use it as a loss buffering mechanism (Linville and Fischer, 
1991). Accordingly, this paper predicts that people will be more likely to pay debt in 
accordance with their APR when the number of debt accounts significantly grows. It is 
important to note that we arbitrarily chose the number of debt accounts to increase to five 
as credit reports show that American consumers, on average, own five credit cards 
(Credit Card Report, 2012). 
 
H3: People who own two debt accounts are more likely to allocate most of 
their budget toward the debt with the smaller balance than people who 
have five debt accounts. 
 
1.7 Debt Management and the Source of Income 
 
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) suggests that people are more 
sensitive to losses than to corresponding gains relative to their current reference point. 
That is, for the equivalent gain and loss, the loss will be accentuated relative to the 
14 
 
corresponding gain. When payment is loosely decoupled from consumption, it is a 
hedonic loss (Prelec and Lowenstein, 1998) such that people feel pain when paying. 
Research indicates that the “pain of payment” is caused by the nature of the payment. 
Prelec and Lowenstein (1998) indicate that paying in cash elicits greater pain of payment 
than paying by other modes of payment. Similarly, Soman (2001) finds that the pain of 
payment is immediate in the case of cash payments, whereas the pain is attenuated in the 
case of credit card payments. 
Paying with windfall income reduces the pain of payment (Soman and Cheema, 
2001). Windfall money is unexpected and thus, it is unbudgeted income. Parting with a 
resource that was earned with effort is more painful than windfall money that is received 
effortlessly. People also feel more ownership of the former resource than the latter 
(Soman, 2001). Windfall money is typically spent more frivolously than normal income 
(Thaler, 1985). Windfall money also evokes positive feelings and promotes self-
gratification (Levav and McGraw, 2009). O’Curry and Strahilevitz (2001) demonstrate 
that people are more willing to buy hedonic products with a windfall gain than with 
ordinary income. 
Accordingly, this paper proposes that people will pay their debt more rationally 
when they use effortful money rather than windfall money. That is, people are more 
likely to pay off the debt with the highest APR when they spend from their savings than 
when their income source is windfall money. Conversely, people are more inclined to pay 
off the smallest debt with the lowest APR when they spend their windfall money as 
opposed to their savings. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is set forth: 
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H4a: People who use windfall money are more likely to allocate most of 
their budget toward the debt with the smaller balance than people who use 
the equivalent amount of money from their savings. 
 
Effort is often not available in a monetary format; however, people may convert it 
into a task that can be rewarded financially and psychologically in the future. For 
instance, a loyalty program allows people to earn reward points toward their future 
purchases. These reward points have both financial (e.g., when they are redeemed) and 
psychological (e.g., status) meanings to consumers (Hsee, Yu, and Zhang, 2003). 
Research indicates that “sunk cost effect” appear for the effort people invest into loyalty 
programs (Kivetz and Simonson, 2002), but it is of a weaker magnitude when compared 
to monetary investments (Soman, 2001). The reason is that individuals either fail to 
calculate the opportunity costs of effort when unstated (Neumann and Friedman, 1980) or 
they discount it when prompted (Hoskin, 1983). When people invest non-monetary 
resources, they notice the pain of investment, but they are less sensitive to their loss as 
compared to a monetary investment (Monga and Saini, 2009). In other words, parting 
with non-monetary income will be less painful than spending money that was earned with 
hardship. Kivetz et al. (2006) find that people feel they are entitled to indulge when they 
use their loyalty program points. When the disutility of payment appears less evidently, 
people will be more likely to spend their reward points irrespective of the true cost of the 
debt. Hence, this paper proposes that people are more likely to pay off the smallest debt 
with the lowest APR when the income source is reward points rather than money from 
their savings. 
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H4b: People who use reward-based money are more likely to allocate 
most of their budget toward the debt with the smaller balance than people 
who use the equivalent amount of money from their savings. 
 
1.8 Why Does This Effect Occur? 
 
Past research findings suggest that people account for their costs and seek benefits 
to close their mental accounts. Heath and Soll (1996) indicate that individuals track the 
costs of their expenses and assign those costs to the relevant mental account. By doing so, 
a consumer may evaluate the overall experience as gain or loss depending upon whether 
the positive utility of consumption surpasses the negative utility of financial payment 
(Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998). Soman (2001) finds that people actively track the cost of 
their mental accounts and depending upon the nature of the cost (e.g., time vs. money), 
they demonstrate different sunk cost effects. Similarly, Soster, Monga, and Bearden 
(2010) confirm that mental cost tracking mediates the likelihood to seek benefits after a 
payment.  
The notion of tracking the cost of multiple debt accounts, each being treated as a 
segregated loss, creates a cognitive and emotional burden for individuals (Soman, 2001). 
This is because the segregation of losses makes each loss appear independently and more 
saliently (Cheema and Soman, 2008). Dealing with segregated losses is distressing and 
may evoke strong negative emotions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The renewable 
resource model (Linville and Fischer, 1991) asserts that individuals have limited, but 
renewable, loss buffering resources that are used to attenuate the aversive impacts of 
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negative events. When people monitor the cost of multiple debt accounts simultaneously, 
their loss buffering resources will be depleted immediately. Therefore, people need to 
substitute a coping mechanism to offset some of the costs associated with their total debt 
accounts. One strategy is to change the structure of segregated losses and eliminate one 
(or more) of the losses from the set. Brenner et al. (2007) show that people, arbitrarily, 
part with a loss so that they can keep their emotions under control.  If borrowers know 
that their available budget can be used toward reducing (or eliminating) the total cost of 
the mental account, they will decide to close one of the mental accounts to attenuate the 
aversive impact of multiple losses. Therefore, we propose that individuals’ motivation to 
reduce the number of debt accounts is the underlying rationale that explains why credit 
card users pay off their debt irrationally. 
 
H5: The interaction between the number of credit cards and the type of 
income on individuals’ tendency to allocate their budget toward the 
smallest debt is fully mediated by their motivation to reduce the number of 
debt accounts. 
 
1.9 Overview of the Studies 
 
The core research question in this paper is whether people manage their debt 
rationally when they own multiple credit cards. Our research hypothesizes that people 
have a tendency to reduce the number of debt accounts rather than the total cost of debt. 
This is demonstrated by paying off the loan with the lowest balance, regardless of the 
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interest rate. In addition, we investigate how various factors, such as the nature of income 
(e.g., savings vs. reward-based vs. windfall), number of credit cards, type of debt (e.g., 
hedonic vs. utilitarian), and timing of loan benefits (e.g., past vs. future), may moderate 
the debt management anomaly. Three experiments are designed to examine these 
predictions. Experiment 1 uses a scenario-based study to illustrate the main effect (H1). 
Subjects read a scenario about owning two credit cards from different financial 
institutions. One of the credit cards has a debt equal to $600 with a 12% (18%) APR, 
while the other card has a debt equal to $1,200 with an 18% (12%) APR. Participants are 
informed that they have a balance of $600 ($400 or $200) in their savings account after 
paying for their other monthly expenses. Then, they are told they must use their savings 
to pay off part of their debt. Participants are given the freedom to allocate their money 
toward one or both of their debt account(s).  
The second experiment explores how the debt management is influenced by the 
joint effect of the nature (e.g., hedonic vs. utilitarian) and the timing of debt benefits (e.g., 
past vs. future). Akin to the first experiment, participants are told that they own two credit 
cards from two different financial institutions. However, unlike the first experiment, we 
did not manipulate the interest rate of the cards as the purpose of this study was to 
investigate how the debt management anomaly could be moderated. For all condition, the 
first credit card has a debt equal to $600 with 12% APR, while the second card has a debt 
equal to $1,200 with 18% APR. We propose that when the consumption for which the 
debt was incurred has been satisfied, people are more willing to pay off the smaller 
balance associated with hedonic consumption than utilitarian consumption (H2a). 
Conversely, when consumption benefits are expected in the future, borrowers are more 
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willing to pay off debt associated with utilitarian consumption than debt associated with 
hedonic consumption (H2b). 
The third experiment examines whether people’s debt repayment decision is 
conditioned on the number of credit cards and the nature of allocated income. In 
particular, we compare the likelihood of paying off the smallest debt ($600) with the 
lowest interest rate (12%) by varying the number of credit cards individuals own (two vs. 
five) and the nature of income that individuals allocate toward debt payment (savings vs. 
windfall vs. frequent flyer). We hypothesize that people’s irrational debt payment is 
attenuated when the number of credit cards increases (H3) and when individuals use their 
hard earned savings compared to either frequent flyer (H4a) or windfall money (H4b). 
We suggest that the motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts underlies these 
effects (H5). This mediating process reveals that people actively monitor the cost of 
multiple debt accounts and plan to close one of the mental accounts to sufficiently 
progress toward their end goal of becoming debt free. 
 
1.10 Experiment 1 
 
 This experiment tests the prediction that people are debt averse and they exhibit 
this tendency by reducing the number of debt accounts. This behavior is financially 
irrational when the smallest debt has the lowest interest rate because individuals neglect 
the opportunity cost of their income and they underestimate the financial cost of their 
total debt. Irrespective of the manipulation of the interest rates between credit cards, we 
expect subjects to overwhelmingly allocate their budget toward the smallest credit card 
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debt when they intend to pay the entire (i.e., actual progress) or a relatively major portion 
of the balance of the smallest debt (i.e., illusion of progress). However, this tendency 
diminishes when the budget covers a relatively minor portion of the balance of the 
smallest debt (i.e., no progress).  
 
1.10.1 Pretest. This experiment involved scenarios where we manipulated the 
perception of debt payment fulfillment. The perception of actual progress toward the debt 
payment was created by informing subjects that they have a total of $600 in their savings 
account to allocate to their existing debt. Since the balance of one of the credit cards was 
$600 across all conditions, the presented budget matched the lowest debt amount and 
participants were able to completely pay off (close) one of the debt accounts if they 
desired to do so. It should be noted that any other budget that exceeds $600 should 
conceptually create the same perception of actual progress toward the sub-goal, but we 
conservatively chose an income that matched, not exceeded, the smallest debt balance. 
We conducted a pretest among a group of undergraduate students (n=22) to 
identify the minimum income that induced the illusion of progress and the maximum 
income that created the perception of no progress toward the debt payment. We used the 
same credit card scenario from the main study in that subjects were told that they owned 
two credit cards from different, but equal, financial institutions. The first credit card 
carried a debt equal to $600 with 12% APR and the second credit card carried $1,200 in 
debt with 18% APR. Respondents imagined that they wanted to pay the smallest debt 
equal to $600, but they had less than $600 in their savings account. Then, they were 
presented with two questions with sliding scales, each ranging from $0 to $599.  The 
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questions were: “By moving the slider to the left or right, please indicate the minimum 
[maximum] income that when used entirely would [not] give you the impression of 
progress toward the credit card debt payment”. We counterbalanced the order of these 
questions to eliminate any order bias. Our results indicated that, on average, people with 
a minimum of $428.56 (SD=61.44) in their savings account formed an impression of 
progress, whereas individuals with a maximum of $188.33 (SD=49.61) perceived no 
progress toward debt management. Using the one sample t-test, we compared these 
values to $400 and $200 correspondingly and they were not significantly different (t’s<1, 
p>.05). Thus, in the main experiment, we used $400 in the savings account to manipulate 
the illusion of progress and $200 in the savings account to manipulate the illusion of no 
progress toward debt payment. 
 
1.10.2 Design, participants, and procedure. This experiment is a 2 (smallest 
debt APR: 12% vs. 18%) x 3 (budget limit: $600 vs. $400 vs. $200) between subjects 
factorial design. Two hundred forty-six undergraduate students were recruited from a 
public, southern  university in the United States to participate in this experiment in 
exchange for partial course credit (Mage=22.36 years, SD=5.14; males=119 and 
females=125). A total of five individuals were later excluded from the analyses as they 
either failed the manipulation check or they did not finish the survey completely. Subjects 
completed an online survey and were randomly assigned to the one of the six possible 
conditions. The first two pages of the study were common to all conditions. They 
described the purpose of the study and asked for consent to participate. The scenario 
asked participants to imagine that they had two credit cards from different financial 
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institutions, M and S. Depending upon the experimental condition, subjects were 
informed that they had a debt equal to $600 with a 12% (18%) APR on credit card M and 
a debt equal to $1,200 with an 18% (12%) APR on credit card S. We manipulated the 
interest rates assigned to the credit cards such that half of subjects associated the smallest 
debt with the highest APR, whereas another half associated it with the lowest APR. 
Participants were also informed that they had a balance of ($600 or$400 or$200) in their 
savings account after paying for all their expenses. Then, they were asked to use their 
savings to pay off their existing debt the way they preferred. The aim was to see how 
participants allocated their income between two credit cards. The scenario for the 
smallest debt with the lowest APR is presented below. Please note that words in the 
brackets denote the conditions to which participants were randomly assigned. 
 
“Imagine that you have recently graduated and are in a new job making 
an after-tax salary of $3,600 per month. You are keen to reduce the debt 
you incurred while in college, and after paying for rent, groceries, 
utilities, and entertainment, you have a balance of $600 [$400/$200]. 
 
Currently, you have two credit cards, say, M and S. Credit card M has a 
debt of $600 @ 12% [18%] APR and credit card S has a debt of $1,200 @ 
18% [12%] APR. Assume that you have paid the minimum balance of 
each credit card and you want to use $600 [$400/$200] from savings to 
pay down your debt. 
 
Please indicate how you would use the budget to reduce your existing 
debt. You may choose to allocate the budget to one of the accounts or 
spread your money across both accounts.” 
 
In the last page of the survey, we asked participants to answer manipulation check 
questions and to indicate their level of involvement and their overall knowledge of credit 
card terms. 
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1.10.3 Independent variables. 
 1.10.3.1 Smallest debt APR. We chose two interest rates of 12% and 18% for 
this experiment. We manipulated the order of assignment of these interest rates between 
credit cards at two levels. First, we assigned 12% APR to credit card M which had the 
smallest balance ($600) and 18% APR to credit card S which had the largest balance 
($1200). Additionally, we reversed the order of the APR assignment, meaning that credit 
card M with a $600 balance was given 18% APR, while credit card S with $1,200 
balance was shown with 12% APR. 
 
 1.10.3.2 Income level. The amount of income that participants were allowed  
to use to pay down their credit card debt was manipulated at three levels. The first group 
was told that they had $600 in their savings account. This income was equal to the debt 
balance on credit card M. The second group was given $400 in their savings account to 
pay down their debt. Finally, the last group had $200 in their savings account to be used 
for debt payment. This income was presented to all participants as the net savings after all 
expenses were deducted. We expect the $600 income to create the impression of actual 
progress, the $400 income to convey the illusion of progress, and the $200 to be 
interpreted as no progress toward debt reduction. These values were chosen based upon 
the results of the pretest that we reported earlier.   
 
1.10.4 Dependent variable. The dependent variable is was the proportion of 
budget allocated to the smallest balance. We presented a sliding scale next to each credit 
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card and asked participants how much of their existing budget they wanted to allocate to 
each debt account. Each scale was shown in $20 increments and moving the slider to the 
right (left) increased (decreased) the allocated budget to the credit card debt. The system 
only allowed subjects to pay down debt across both credit cards up to their given budget. 
Next, we divided the amount money that each person allocated to the smallest balance 
(i.e., credit card M) by their income to calculate the proportion of budget allocated to the 
smallest balance. For example, this proportion for a person with $600 income was .7 if 
he/she allocated $420 to credit card M and $180 to credit card S. 
 
1.10.5 Covariates. We measured participants’ overall knowledge of credit card 
terms by asking them to rate the following attributes on a 7-point semantic scale (1=one 
of the least knowledgeable and 7=one of the most knowledgeable): APR%, minimum 
balance, payment due date, credit card limit, and outstanding balance. An average of the 
five items was used as a measure of overall credit card knowledge (Cronbach’s 
alpha=.86). The level of involvement with the task was also measured by averaging four 
7-point semantic differential scales adapted from Wang and Calder (2006). In particular, 
we asked participants to indicate whether when they were reading the credit card scenario 
“they were very involved,” ”they were very interested,” “they read the information 
carefully,” and “they paid a lot of attention.” These items were also found to be highly 
reliable (Cronbach’s alpha=.93). Neither the overall knowledge nor the task involvement 
revealed significant effect on the dependent variables. Therefore, they were not 
controlled in subsequent analyses. 
 
25 
 
1.10.6 Results. 
 1.10.6.1 Manipulation check. We assessed the success of the manipulation of 
the independent variables with three questions at the end of the survey. First, we asked 
people in a multiple-choice question to select the option that properly indicated the 
balance of credit card debt and their pertinent APRs. Consistent with the information 
presented in each condition, all but one chose the correct response. Next, we used a 
recognition task wherein people indicated the amount of budget that they allocated to the 
debt accounts. No respondents failed in this task either. Finally, we asked individuals to 
indicate on a 7-point asymmetrical scale to what extent their payment resembled progress 
toward being debt free (1=not at all and 7=very much). Overall, individuals who were 
assigned to the $600 (M=5.42) and $400 income (M=4.81) perceived greater progress 
toward their end goal when compared to the group with the $200 income (M=3.09; 
t=4.36, p<.05 and t=2.66, p<.05, correspondingly). No significant difference in the 
perception of progress toward the total debt payment goal was observed between the 
income levels of $600 and $400 (t=1.62, p>.05). Therefore, a total of 241 responses that 
met the above criteria were kept for further analyses. 
 
 1.10.6.2 Support for H1. A 2 (smallest debt APR: 12% vs. 18%) x 3 (income 
level: $600 vs. $400 vs. $200) ANOVA with the proportion of budget allocated to debt 
with the smallest balance as the dependent variable demonstrated significant main effects 
of smallest debt APR (F (1,235) =358.63, p<.05) and income level (F (2,235) =125.47, 
p<.05). More importantly, however, these main effects were qualified by a significant 
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interaction between the smallest debt APR and income (F (2, 235) =126.99, p<.05). 
Figure 1 illustrates these results. 
 
 
Figure 1. The influence of income and the interest rate on the proportion of income  
allocated to debt with the smaller balance and the lower APR. 
 
Consistent with the classical economic models, planned contrasts showed that 
when the smallest balance had the highest APR, participants allocated a major proportion 
of their income to the smallest balance, irrespective of their income level. In other words, 
no difference was observed for the proportion of payment allocated to the smallest 
balance among the three income levels (F (2, 118) =1.13, p>.05). 
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In contrast, our results indicated that in the smallest balance with the lowest APR 
condition, and consistent with H1, the proportion of payment allocated to the debt with 
the smallest balance and the lowest APR for both people who had a $600 income (M$600 
income=.78) and a $400 income (M$400 income=.75) were significantly higher than for those 
people who had a $200 income (M$200 income=.32; F (1, 117) =261.92, p<.05, and F (1, 
117) =270.80, p<.05, respectively). No difference was found between the proportion of 
payment allocated to the debt with the smallest balance and the lowest APR for both 
people who had a $600 income and those who had a $400 income (F (1, 117) =1.51, 
p>.05). 
 
1.10.7 Discussion. A rational consumer should first pay off the debt with the 
highest interest rate. Once this debt has been paid off completely, then the second most 
expensive debt should be paid off, and so on. Our results indicated that this pattern only 
existed when the smallest balance had the highest APR. Interestingly, however, we found 
special conditions wherein borrowers departed from rational debt management. More 
specifically, in support of H1, our results determined that borrowers’ tendency to reduce 
the number of debt accounts as opposed to the total financial cost of debt emerged when 
users passed a certain income level and the smallest balance had the lowest APR. 
Consistent with the goal-gradient hypothesis (Kivetz et al., 2006), our findings indicated 
that when people perceived actual progress toward debt account elimination by having 
$600 income (i.e., they can pay off the entire debt on one of the credit cards) or they 
thought they had sufficiently progressed toward becoming debt free by spending a $400 
income toward their debt  (i.e., the illusion of being so close to paying off the entire debt 
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on one of the credit cards), they allocated most of their income toward the debt with the 
smallest balance and the lowest APR. We suspect that this irrational decision took place 
because the total debt payment was in the distant future and people took an alternative 
route (e.g., attaining sub-goals) to reduce the number of their debt accounts. 
Contrary to the classic economic models, Study 1 demonstrated that people do not 
always manage their credit card debt rationally. However, the experimental scenarios 
used in this study neither articulated the purpose of the loan nor did they refer to the 
timing of debt benefits. It would be insightful to explore whether the irrationality in debt 
payment is influenced by these factors. We designed the following study to investigate 
the concurrent effects of the nature (e.g., hedonic vs. utilitarian) and the timing of debt 
benefits (e.g., past vs. future) on borrowers’ debt management. 
 
1.11 Experiment 2 
 
Experiment 2 tests the prediction that people’s decision in debt payment is often 
affected by the nature and the timing of debt benefits. In particular, this study examines 
the proposition that when consumption benefits have been realized in the past, people are 
more willing to pay off the debt with the smallest balance associated with hedonic 
consumption than utilitarian consumption (H2a). Conversely, when consumption benefits 
are expected in the future, borrowers are more willing to pay off the debt with the 
smallest balance associated with utilitarian consumption than hedonic consumption 
(H2b).  
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1.11.1 Pretests. We chose two vehicle upgrades to represent hedonic and 
utilitarian benefits based on the results of two pretests. First, a group of undergraduate 
students (n=26) read information about two possible upgrade packages for a vehicle, 
namely luxury and technology packages. The luxury package included leather seats, seat 
warmers, and panoramic sunroof, while the technology package offered in-dash GPS, 
Tiptronic transmission, and an advanced suspension system. We told all participants that 
both upgrades cost approximately $1,800. Then, subjects were asked to rate each upgrade 
package based on ten 7-point semantic differential scales developed by Voss et al. 
(2003): ineffective/effective; unhelpful/helpful, not functional/functional, 
unnecessary/necessary, impractical/practical, fun/not fun, exciting/dull, delightful/not 
delightful, thrilling/not thrilling, and enjoyable/unenjoyable. The first five items 
measured the utilitarian dimension, while the second five items measured the hedonic 
dimension of the upgrade package. Then, we subtracted the sum of the multi-item scale 
measures for hedonism from that of utilitarianism to create a composite hedonism index 
(Voss et al., 2003). We also counterbalanced the order of presentation of upgrade 
packages to prevent any bias in responses. Overall, the results from this pretest found that 
the luxury package, when compared to the technology package, had a higher composite 
hedonism index. Consequently, it was found to be more hedonic in nature (M luxury 
package=3.18 vs. M technology package=-1.52; t (1, 25) = 4.86, p<.05). Additionally, we asked 
participants to indicate to what extent these upgrade packages were attractive (1=very 
unattractive, 7=very attractive) and important (1=very unimportant, 7=very important) to 
them. Findings showed that the upgrade packages were perceived to be equally attractive 
and important to the subjects (F’s<1, p>.05). 
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1.11.2 Design, participants, and procedure. This experiment is a 2 (nature of 
debt: hedonic vs. utilitarian) x 2 (timing of the consumption benefits: past vs. future) 
between subject factorial design. One hundred sixty-five undergraduate students from the 
same university participated in this experiment in exchange for partial course credit 
(Mage=22.48 years, SD=4.02; males=90 and females=75). A total of three responses were 
deleted from further analyses as they either failed the manipulation checks or they were 
incomplete.  
An online survey with four scenarios was created and respondents were randomly 
assigned to one of the conditions. The first two pages of the study were common to all 
conditions. They described the purpose of the study and asked for consent to participate 
in it. Similar to Study 1, subjects were told that they owned two credit cards from 
different financial institutions, M and S. Credit card M had a debt of $600 @ 12% APR 
and credit card S had a debt of $1,200 @ 18% APR. Participants were informed that the 
total debt on both cards (e.g., $1,800) was incurred due to an upgrade to their vehicle. 
When the type of debt was hedonic, the upgrade was presented as a luxury package that 
included leather seats, seat warmers, and panoramic sunroof. Conversely, when the type 
of debt was utilitarian, the upgrade was described as a technology package that included 
in-dash GPS, Tiptronic transmission, and an advanced suspension system. In addition, we 
manipulated the timing of debt benefits by telling one group of participants that the 
upgrade was on a vehicle that they don’t own anymore (e.g., past consumption benefits), 
whereas the other group was told that the upgrade was on a vehicle that they will own in 
the near future (e.g., future consumption benefits). For example, the scenario for the 
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credit card debt with the past hedonic benefits was as follows. Please note that the words 
in the brackets denote the conditions in which the participants were randomly assigned. 
 
“Imagine that you have recently graduated and are in a new job making 
an after-tax salary of $3,600 dollars per month. You are keen to reduce 
the debt you incurred while in college and, after paying for rent, 
groceries, utilities, and entertainment, you have a balance of $600 dollars. 
 
Currently, you have two credit cards, say, M and S. Credit card M has a 
debt of $600 @ 12% APR and credit card S has a debt of $1,200 @ 18% 
APR. Both debts were incurred for a luxury package upgrade (e.g., leather 
seat, heated seats, and panoramic sunroof) [a technology package 
upgrade (e.g., in-dash GPS, Tiptronic transmission, and an advanced 
suspension system] on your current vehicle that you will own in the near 
future [your old vehicle that you don’t own any longer]. 
 
Please indicate how you would use the budget to reduce your existing 
debt. You could choose to allocate the budget to one of the accounts or 
spread your money across both accounts.” 
 
 Toward the end of the survey, we also collected responses pertaining to the 
manipulation check, level of involvement, and overall knowledge of credit card terms. 
 
1.11.3 Independent variables. 
 1.11.3.1 Nature of debt. The nature of debt was manipulated at two levels: 
hedonic and utilitarian. When the nature of the debt was hedonic, participants were told 
that they were in debt because they upgraded their vehicle with a luxury package that 
included leather seats, seat warmers, and panoramic sunroof. In contrast, when the debt 
was utilitarian in nature, we informed subjects that their total debt was incurred because 
they added a technology package including in-dash GPS, Tiptronic transmission, and an 
advanced suspension system to their car. 
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 1.11.3.2 Timing of the consumption benefits. We framed the consumption 
benefits associated with debt to be experienced either in the past or in the future. We told 
one group o1f respondents that the debt was taken out for a consumption that was 
realized in the past. More specifically, we told individuals that the debt was used toward 
a package upgrade on a vehicle that they had already sold. In contrast, we told the second 
group of subjects that the debt was used toward a consumption that will be satisfied in the 
proximal future. More specifically, people who were assigned to this condition imagined 
that the package upgrade was on a vehicle that they will own in the near future. 
 
1.11.4 Dependent variable. Similar to Study 1, we measured the proportion of 
budget allocated to the debt with the smallest balance to serve as the dependent variable. 
First, participants used a sliding scale to determine how much of their existing budget 
they wanted to allocate to each debt account. Then, the amount money that each person 
allocated to the smallest balance was divided by $600 to calculate the proportion of 
budget allocated to the smallest balance. 
 
1.11.5 Covariates. Similar to Study 1, we controlled for participants’ overall 
knowledge of credit card terms and their level of involvement with the task. Again, these 
factors did not have any significant effect in the overall model and were not addressed in 
the subsequent analyses. 
 
 
33 
 
1.11.6 Results.  
 1.11.6.1 Manipulation check. We assessed the success of the manipulation of 
the independent variables with two questions. First, we examined the manipulation of the 
timing of debt benefits by asking respondents to rate the following question on a 7-point 
Likert scale (1=strongly disagree and 7=strongly agree): “I seek benefits in the debt 
associated with the vehicle package upgrade.” As was intended, subjects in the future 
debt benefits condition sought more benefits than did those in the past (expired) debt 
benefits condition (M future=5.68 vs. M past=2.82; t (1, 158) = 4.36, p<.05). Additionally, 
we affirmed the hedonic nature of the luxury package and utilitarian nature of the 
technology package by using the single-item measures of hedonism and utilitarianism 
developed by Wertenbroch and Dhar (2000). In particular, at the end of the survey, 
subjects in each condition were asked to indicate how they rate the vehicle package 
upgrade on a single hedonic scale of zero (“not at all hedonic”) to six (“extremely 
hedonic”) and a single utilitarian scale of zero (“not at all utilitarian”) to six (“extremely 
utilitarian”). Then, we calculated a composite hedonism rating as the difference between 
each subject’s hedonic rating and the utilitarian rating. This measure was also adopted 
from the Wertenbroch and Dhar (2000) study. As was expected, the luxury package had a 
higher composite hedonism rating than did the technology package (M luxury package=2.61 
vs. M technology package=-.9; t (1, 158) = 4.11, p<.05). 
 
 1.11.6.2 Support for H2a and H2b. A 2 (nature of debt: hedonic vs. 
utilitarian) x 2 (timing of the consumption benefits: past vs. future) ANOVA with the 
proportion of budget allocated to the debt with the smallest balance as the dependent 
variable produced a significant interaction between two factors (F (1, 158) =76.76, 
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p<.05). However, neither the main effect for debt type (F (1, 158) =3.70, p>.05) nor the 
main effect for debt benefits (F (1, 158) =.09, p>.05) on the proportion of budget 
allocated to the debt with the smallest balance were significant. Planned contrasts 
indicated that when benefits of consumption for which the debt was borrowed were 
realized in the past,  participants allocated more budget toward the debt with the smallest 
balance when it was associated with the hedonic, as opposed to the utilitarian 
consumption (M
 hedonic=.77 vs. M utilitarian=.54; F (1, 79) =74.10, p<.05). This finding 
supports H2a. That is, among people who have debt on two credit cards, people manage 
the debt associated with prior hedonic consumption more irrationally than the debt 
associated with prior utilitarian consumption. On the contrary, when debt benefits were 
expected to occur in the future, we found the effect to be reversed. That is, participants 
allocated more budget toward the debt with the smallest balance when it was associated 
with utilitarian as compared to hedonic consumption (M utilitarian=.73 vs. M hedonic=.59; F 
(1, 79) =18.42, p<.05). Therefore, we support H2b which states that among people who 
have debt on two credit cards, people manage the debt associated with the future 
utilitarian consumption more irrationally than the debt associated with the future hedonic 
consumption. Figure 3 illustrates these findings. 
 
1.11.7 Discussion. Although both hedonic and utilitarian consumption offer 
benefits to consumers and one is not superior than the other, our findings, in support of 
H2a and H2b, demonstrated that debt payment decisions varied based on the nature and 
the timing of debt benefits. More specifically, we found that when debt benefits were 
realized in the past, people were more inclined to allocate money toward the debt with 
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smallest balance and lowest APR when it was associated with hedonic consumption than 
utilitarian consumption. 
 
 
Figure 2. The influence of the purpose of debt and consumption benefits on the 
proportion of income allocated to debt with the smaller balance and the lower APR 
 
We argue that this effect occurred because consumption benefits were satisfied in 
the past and hedonic experiences depreciated faster than utilitarian experiences (Voss et 
al., 2003). Therefore, according to the “benefit depreciation” concept (Gourville and 
Soman, 1998), the debt associated with past hedonic consumption appeared as a larger 
loss than the equivalent debt attributed to past utilitarian consumption. However, we 
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demonstrated that people allocated more money toward the debt with the smallest balance 
and lowest APR when it was associated with hedonic consumption more so than 
utilitarian consumption when consumption benefits were expected in the future. 
Therefore, individuals were more likely to irrationally pay off the debt associated with 
the utilitarian consumption than the hedonic consumption when consumption was 
planned in the future. We think this reversal took place because people anticipated more 
enjoyment from hedonic than utilitarian consumption (Shiv and Huber, 2000) and they 
did not want to alter their emotional state by making a payment (Soman and Gourville, 
2001). 
This study in the context of debt management complements previous research 
efforts that demonstrate preference reversals between hedonic and utilitarian alternatives 
in decision contexts (Wertenbroch and Dhar, 2000) and presentation format (Okada, 
2005). For example, Wertenbroch and Dhar (2000) found that a hedonic item, when 
compared to the same utilitarian item, is selected more frequently in forfeiture than in 
acquisition choices. Further, Okada (2005) determined that between two equivalent 
hedonic and utilitarian options, people preferred the hedonic alternative over the 
utilitarian one when each was presented singly. However, this preference was reversed 
when the utilitarian and hedonic alternatives were presented simultaneously. Our study 
extends this stream of research by showing that when the hedonic and utilitarian 
consumption is linked to a credit card debt, it may carry negative connotations and may 
imply a distinct perception of loss depending upon the timing of the consumption 
occurrence. 
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Study 1 and 2 explored the intrinsic attributes of debt (e.g., APR, timing, and the 
nature of debt benefits) and their subsequent impact on irrational debt management. 
Study 3 will examine the influence of external factors, such as the number of debt 
accounts and the nature of allocated income on people’s irrational deb payment. In 
addition, Study 3 will introduce the motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts as 
the underlying mechanism for the effects we observed across all studies regarding 
individuals’ tendency toward paying a debt with the smallest balance and the lowest 
APR. 
 
1.12 Experiment 3 
 
This experiment examines the proposition that external factors, such as the 
number of debt accounts and the type of allocated income, may also influence credit card 
debt management. More specifically, this study tests the predictions that people tend to 
manage their debt more irrationally when they have fewer number of debt accounts or 
when they use their reward-based or windfall money for the purpose of debt payment. 
We demonstrate that the proportion of income allocated to the debt with the smallest 
balance significantly increases when people have two instead of five credit cards (H3) 
and when they use windfall (H4a) or reward money (H4b), as opposed to a comparable 
amount of savings, to pay off their debt. In addition, we provide a process evidence for 
these findings. We suggest the motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts to be the 
underpinning mechanism for the tendency toward irrational debt management (H5). 
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1.12.1 Design, participants, and procedure. This experiment is a 2 (number of 
credit cards: two vs. five) x 3 (type of income: savings vs. reward-based vs. windfall) 
between subject factorial design. Two hundred seventy-eight undergraduate students 
from the same university participated in this experiment in exchange for partial course 
credit (Mage=22.46 years, SD=4.48; males=127 and females=150). A total of eight 
responses were deleted from further analyses as they either failed the manipulation 
checks or they were incomplete. Subjects completed an online survey and were randomly 
assigned to one of the six possible conditions. The first two pages of the study were 
common to all conditions. They described the purpose of the study and asked for consent 
to participate in it. 
In the scenarios, participants imagined that they had either two (e.g., M and S) or 
five (e.g., M, N, P, R, and S) credit cards from different financial institutions, and the 
total cost of recent home improvements were divided among these credit cards. In all 
experimental conditions, credit card M carried a debt of $600 @ 12% APR and credit 
card S had a debt of $1,200 @ 18% APR. In the five credit cards condition, credit cards 
N, P, and R had different debt equal to $1,100, $1,400, and $1,000 @ 16% APR. 
Depending upon the experimental manipulation, respondents were informed that after 
they paid the minimum balance of their cards, they had a balance of $600 in savings, or 
they had accumulated 6,000 reward points from an airline frequent flier program which 
was equivalent to $600, or they received a bonus of $600 on their paycheck. Then, they 
were asked to use their entire income, regardless of format, to pay off their existing debt 
in any way that they preferred. The outcome was to observe how participants allocate 
their budget among credit cards. The scenario for five credit cards and $600 of reward 
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money is presented below. Please note that words in the brackets denote the conditions in 
which the participants were randomly assigned. 
 
“Imagine that you have recently graduated and are in a new job making 
an after-tax salary of $3,600 per month. You are keen to reduce the debt 
you incurred while in college, and after paying for rent, groceries, 
utilities, and entertainment, you have a zero balance, but you have 
accumulated 6,000 reward points from an airline frequent flier program 
that allows you to cash in your points for $600 [You have a zero balance, 
but you discover that you have received a bonus of $600 on your 
paycheck/you have a balance of $600]. 
 
Currently, you have five credit cards, say, M, N, P, R, and S [two credit 
cards, say M and S]. Credit card M has a debt of $600 @ 12% APR. 
Credit cards N, P, and R have different debts of $1,100, $1,400, and 
$1,000 @ 16% APR. Credit card S has a debt of $1,200 @ 18% APR 
[Credit card S has a debt of $1,200 @ 18% APR]. The total debt was 
incurred due to a home improvement project that you recently finished. 
 
Please indicate how you would use the entire budget to reduce your 
existing debt. You could choose to allocate the budget to one of the 
accounts or spread your money across the accounts.” 
 
After participants finished the debt payment decision, they were presented with 
questions designed to measure participants’ motivation to reduce the number of debt 
accounts. Next, subjects responded to the manipulation check questions. Finally, they 
indicated their level of involvement and their overall knowledge of credit card terms. 
 
1.12.2 Independent variables. 
 1.12.2.1 Number of credit cards. We manipulated the number of existing debt 
accounts at two levels. The first group of respondents owned two credit cards from 
different financial institutions, M and S. Credit card M had a debt of $600 @ 12% APR 
and credit card S had a debt of $1,200 @ 18% APR. The second group of subjects owned 
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five credit cards from different financial institutions, M, N, P, R, and S. Credit card M 
had a debt of $600 @ 12% APR credit cards N, P, and R had debt equal to $1,100, 
$1,400, and $1,000 @ 16% APR, correspondingly , and credit card S had a debt of 
$1,200 @ 18% APR.  
 
 1.12.2.2 Type of allocated income. The type of income that participants were 
allowed to use to pay down their credit card debt was manipulated at three levels. The 
first group was told that they had $600 in their savings account. The second group was 
told that their savings account was empty, but they had accumulated 6,000 reward points 
from an airline frequent flier program that were worth $600. Finally, the last group 
imagined that the balance of their savings account was zero, but they received a bonus of 
$600 on their paycheck. We asked all participants to allocate their entire income toward 
reduction of their credit card debt. 
 
1.12.3 Dependent variable. Similar to previous studies, the dependent variable 
was the proportion of income allocated to the debt with the smallest balance and the 
lowest APR. First, participants used a sliding scale to determine how much of their 
existing budget they wanted to allocate to each debt account. Then, the amount of money 
that each person allocated to the smallest balance was divided by $600 to calculate the 
proportion of income allocated to the smallest balance. 
 
1.12.4 Process evidence. We elaborate our findings by identifying the underlying 
cognitive process. We suggest that the tendency toward irrational debt management 
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would be mediated by individuals’ motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts. To 
the best of our knowledge, to date, no study has yet to develop a psychometrically sound 
scale to measure this construct. We created an initial pool of six items to capture the 
definition of this construct in the context of multiple credit cards. Items’ wordings were 
reviewed by two independent judges to minimize ambiguity and ensure face validity. 
We administered this scale with the sample used in Study 1 (n=152). After 
participants allocated their budget toward debt payment, they were presented with six 
items developed for the motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts construct. All 
items were measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1= strongly disagree and 7=very 
strongly agree). Field (2009) indicates that an item should be deleted from a pool of items 
if it has an item-to-total correlation less than .5. One item did not meet this criterion and 
was dropped from the items’ pool. Therefore, five items with a reasonable reliability 
index (Cronbach’s alpha=.88) were retained for Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) to 
check the dimensionality of the scale. The maximum likelihood method as an inferential 
technique and an iterative principle axis factoring as a mathematical approach were used. 
Both methods conclusively found that this construct was one-dimensional, explaining 
65% of the total variance. Therefore, the responses to the five items were averaged to 
form a single variable for individuals’ motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts. 
The items for this scale are shown in the appendix. 
 
1.12.5 Covariates. Similar to previous studies, participants’ overall knowledge of 
credit card terms and their level of involvement with the task were measured. Again, 
these factors did not significantly influence the dependent variable and were not 
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controlled in forthcoming analyses. 
 
1.12.6 Results. 
 1.12.6.1 Manipulation check. We assessed the success of the manipulation of 
the independent variables with two questions at the end of the survey. First, we asked 
people in a multiple-choice question to select the option that properly indicated the 
balance of credit card debt and their pertinent APRs. A total of nine individuals failed in 
this task and were eliminated from the sample. Next, we used a recognition task wherein 
people chose the amount and the type of income that they allocated to the debt accounts. 
No respondents failed in this task. Therefore, a total of 269 responses which met the 
above criteria were kept for further analyses. 
 
 1.12.6.2 Support for H3. We conducted an ANOVA on the proportion of 
income allocated to the debt with the smallest balance and the lowest APR as a function 
of the number of credit cards and the type of allocated income. There was a significant 
main effect of the number of credit cards (F (1, 263) = 185.60, p<.05) and a significant 
main effect of the type of allocated income (F (2, 263) = 12.19, p<.05). These main 
effects were also qualified by a significant interaction of the number of credit cards and 
the type of income (F (2, 263) = 3.53, p<.05). 
 Planned comparisons tested the effects of the number of credit cards on the 
proportion of income allocated to the debt with the smallest balance when the type of 
income was savings, windfall, and reward-based. These tests determined that the 
proportion of income allocated to the debt with the smallest balance declined 
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significantly from the two credit card condition (M=.60) to the five credit card condition 
(M=.38; F (1, 98) =57.93, p<.05), when savings were used. A similar pattern was also 
observed for reward-based and windfall income conditions. More specifically, when the 
income allocated to the debt payment was reward-based, there was a significant decrease 
in the proportion of income allocated to the debt with the smallest balance between the 
two and five credit card conditions (M two credit cards=.76 vs. M five credit cards=.43; F (1, 77) 
=61.40, p<.05). The proportion of income allocated to the debt with the smallest balance 
when participants allocated their windfall income toward debt payment also significantly 
dropped from the two credit card condition (M=.77) to the five credit card condition 
(M=.43; F (1, 88) =78.45, p<.05). Overall, these results support H4, stating that people 
who have debt on two credit cards manage their debt more irrationally than people who 
have debt on five credit cards. 
 
 1.12.6.3 Support for H4a and H4b. Additional follow-up planned contrasts 
compared the proportion of income allocated to the debt with the smallest balance for 
savings, windfall, and reward-based income at two different numbers of credit cards, two 
and five. In support of H4a, when people had two credit cards, the proportion of income 
allocated to the debt with the smaller balance for the windfall income (M=.77) was 
significantly higher than that for the savings (M=.60; F (1, 125)=47.18, p<.05). In other 
words, among people who have debt on two credit cards, people who use windfall money 
manage their debt more irrationally than those who use the equivalent amount of money 
from their savings. In addition, in the two credit card condition, we found that the 
proportion of income allocated to the debt with the smaller was significantly greater 
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when people used their reward-based income as compared to their savings (M reward-
based=.76 vs. M savings=.60; F (1, 125)=41.38, p<.05).  
 
 
Figure 3. The influence of the number of credit cards and the type of income on the 
proportion of income allocated to debt with the smallest balance and the lowest APR 
 
 These results support H4b, which states that among people who have debt on two 
credit cards, people who use reward points manage their debt more irrationally than 
people who use the equivalent amount of money from their savings. By contrast, no 
significant difference was observed in the proportion of income allocated to the debt with 
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the smallest balance and the lowest APR among the type of allocated budget when people 
had five credit cards (F (2, 138) =.89, p>.05). Figure 3 illustrates these effects. 
 
 1.12.6.4 Process evidence. We conducted a mediated moderation analysis 
with three regression models (Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt, 2005). Since the proportion of 
income allocated to the debt with the smallest balance and the lowest APR did not differ 
for reward-based and windfall budget in either the two credit card condition (M reward-based 
= .76 vs. M windfall =.77; F<1) or the five credit card condition (M reward-based = .43 vs. M 
windfall = .43; F<1), to reduce the model’s complexity, we combined these two levels in 
subsequent analysis. Hence, the type of income was coded as a dichotomous variable 
(0=savings; 1=other types), as was the number of credit cards (0=two credit cards; 1=five 
credit cards).Table 1 summarizes these regression models.  
The first regression model revealed that the interaction between the number of credit 
cards and the type of income had a significant influence on the proportion of income 
allocated to the debt with the smallest balance and the lowest APR (t (1, 265) = -2.64, 
p<.05). The second analysis determined that the interaction between the number of credit 
cards and the type of income in the presence of main effects had a significant influence 
on individuals’ motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts (t(1, 265) = 2.34, 
p<.05). The third model indicated that when the motivation to reduce the number of debt 
accounts (mediator), the main effects, and the interaction between the number of credit 
cards and the type of income concurrently predicted the proportion of income allocated 
the debt with the smallest balance and the lowest APR, the mediator was significant (t (1, 
265) = 2.87, p<.05) and the interaction term became insignificant (t (1, 265) = -1.91, 
p>.05). In Support of H5, results across the three models supported the motivation to 
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reduce the number of debt accounts as a mediator of the effects of the number of credit 
cards and the type of income on irrational debt payment (Muller et al., 2005). 
The Sobel test also confirmed that the moderated effect of the number of credit 
cards and the type of income on the proportion of income allocated the debt with the 
smallest balance and the lowest APR via the mediator was significant (z=2.31, p<.05). 
 
1.12.7 Discussion. This study explored the role of the number of credit cards and 
type of income (e.g., savings, reward-based, and windfall) on irrational debt 
management. In support of H3, our findings demonstrated that people who had debt on 
two credit cards managed their debt more irrationally than people who had debt on five 
credit cards. Debt on credit cards represents a potential loss when benefits have been 
enjoyed in the past (Soman, 2001) and people generally close a mental account with a 
negative utility (e.g., loss) once consumption benefits are fully received (Prelec and 
Lowenstein, 1998). The explanation for our findings is derived from prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which indicates that the value function in the domain of 
losses is steepest near zero and gradually becomes flatter when the number of losses 
increases. Therefore, the relative reduction in the perception of loss achieved from 
reducing the number of debt accounts from two to one is significantly more than reducing 
the number of segregated debt from five to four.  
Further, we found that among people who had debt on two credit cards, people 
allocated more income toward the debt with the smallest balance and the lowest APR 
when they used either windfall money (H4a) or reward-based money (H4b) than did 
people who used the equivalent amount of money from their savings. We believe these 
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effects occurred because parting with a resource that people earned with hard work (e.g., 
savings money) was more painful than money such as windfall or reward-based that was 
earned effortlessly (Soman, 2001).Money that people did not work hard for it would be 
spent more frivolously than normal income (Thaler, 1985) because individuals fail to 
calculate the opportunity costs of these investments (Neumann and Friedman, 1980). 
Hence, our participants paid relatively more attention to the total cost of debt 
management as opposed to the number of existing debts when they used their savings. 
We also offered insight regarding the underlying mechanism for these effects. Our 
findings corroborated that the tendency toward irrational debt management was mediated 
by individuals’ motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts (H5). Two plausible 
mechanisms may have created this mediating process. First, the overall subjective 
disutility from segregated losses is more than one aggregated loss (Hsee et al., 2008). 
Therefore, participants may have focused on closing one of the debt accounts to improve 
the overall utility of the remainder of the debt accounts. Second, the ultimate goal of 
borrowers is to be debt free, but this goal is distant. However, there are other sub-goals 
that are perceived to be proximal (e.g., fully paying down one of the credit card’s debt). 
Research indicates that goal proximity enhances attention paid to the goal and the effort 
exerted to attain it (Kivetz et al., 2006). Therefore, our subjects committed themselves to 
pay off an individual loan (e.g., a proximal goal) at the expense of managing debt with 
respect to the total cost of debt (e.g., distant goal). 
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  Table 1. The results of three regression models for testing the mediated moderation
 
Regression Model:1 Regression Model:2 Regression Model:3 
DV: The proportion of 
Income Allocated to the 
Smallest Balance with the 
Lowest APR 
DV: Individuals’ Motivation 
to Reduce the Number of Debt 
Accounts 
DV: The proportion of Income Allocated to 
the Smallest Balance with the Lowest APR 
Coefficien
t 
t-value p-
value 
Coefficien
t 
t-value p-value Coefficient t-value p-value 
Intercept 1.03 1.63 .09 4.15 33.40 .00 .60 11.05 .00 
Number of Credit Cards -.25 -7.88 .00 -.24 -1.48 .14 -.25 -7.94 .00 
Type of Income  
.15 
 
5.09 
 
.00 
 
-.41 
 
-2.65 
 
.01 
 
.15 
 
5.04 
 
.00 
Number of Credit Cards x 
Type of Income 
 
-.05 
 
-2.64 
 
.01 
 
.28 
 
2.34 
 
.02 
 
-.05 
 
-1.91 
 
.06 
 
Individuals’ Motivation to 
Reduce the Number of 
Debt Accounts 
       
.18 
 
2.87 
 
.00 
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1.13 General Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The use of credit cards has grown dramatically and credit card payments have 
begun to replace cash and checks in most transactions. Despite the benefits, however, 
using credit cards has its own costs. The convenience of use and non-immediacy of pain 
of payment has caused about 46% of card holders to report self-control problems in 
spending with credit cards (Bertaut and Haliassos, 2009). Recent credit card statistics find 
that American customers have 801 billion  dollars in revolving debt, resulting in an 
average credit card debt of $15,956 per individual household (Federal Reserve Report, 
2012). Also, industry reports indicate that American customers, on average, have five 
credit cards and the average balance per open credit card is $1,157 (Wilcox, Block, and 
Eisenstein, 2011). This research investigated how people manage multiple credit card 
debt and how they prioritize their debt repayment. 
In this paper, with the support of three experiments, we determined that 
consumers under certain circumstances may manage their debt irrationally (i.e., choosing 
the least optimal payment decision). Our findings in Study 1 demonstrated that when 
people perceived actual progress or they thought that they had sufficiently progressed 
toward debt account elimination, they allocated most of their income toward the debt 
with the smallest balance and the lowest APR (H1). Study 2 demonstrated that debt 
allocation decisions depend upon the nature and timing of debt benefits. More 
specifically, consistent with H2a (H2b), we determined that when debt benefits were 
realized in the past (future), people were more inclined to pay the debt with the smallest 
balance when it was associated with hedonic (utilitarian) consumption rather than 
49 
 
utilitarian (hedonic) consumption. Finally, Study 3 provides evidence that an increase in 
the number of credit cards increases customers’ attention to the total cost of debt (H3). 
Also, our findings revealed that a higher proportion of subjects with two debt accounts 
allocated income toward the debt with the smallest balance when they used either 
windfall money (H4a) or reward-based money (H4b) as opposed to money from savings. 
These effects, however, were not observed when individuals carried five debt accounts. 
The individuals’ motivation to reduce the total number of debt accounts was determined 
to be the underlying mechanism for the debt payment anomaly (H5). 
 
1.13.1 Theoretical implications. Our findings add to the existing literature on 
financial decision making in the following ways. First, we demonstrate that individuals, 
regardless of their income level, make a rational financial decision in debt payment when 
the size of debt balances and their corresponding interest rates negatively correlate. For 
example, individuals first pay a $300 debt with 20% APR and then they pay a $500 debt 
with 15% APR. However, when people’s income meets (or is considerably close to) the 
smallest balance and the size of debt balances corresponds with the size of interest rates, 
irrational debt payment emerges.  This counterintuitive finding is explained with goal-
gradient principle (Kivetz et al., 2006) that suggests that people accelerate effort toward 
attainment of a goal when they have an illusion of progress toward it (i.e., individuals 
allocate their income toward debt that can be successfully eliminated now or in the near 
future). However, when individuals do not perceive progress toward debt payment (i.e., 
their income significantly falls below the balance of the smallest debt), they shift their 
attention toward the goal of reducing the overall cost of debt. This notion is in line with 
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the research by Amar et al. (2011) that indicates that eliminating participants’ ability to 
completely pay off the smallest debt increases rational debt payment. 
Additionally, this paper suggests that irrational debt management is derived from 
people’s inherent tendency to reduce the number of debt accounts. Debts on credit cards 
are perceived as losses and people are motivated to reduce the number of those losses as 
soon as possible (Prelec and Lowenstein, 1998). Our work indicates that people 
psychologically prioritize the allocation of their budget toward the debt with the smallest 
balance and the lowest APR over the largest balance with the highest APR to satisfy their 
desire to eliminate losses. Therefore, at the expense of managing debt with respect to the 
total cost of debt (e.g., a distant goal), debtors paid off an individual loan with respect to 
the desire for debt account elimination (e.g., a proximal goal). 
 
1.13.2 Public policy implications.  Policy makers can protect consumers’ welfare 
by employing the findings of our research in the following ways. First, we argued that the 
attainment of a sub-goal (i.e., eliminating one of the debt accounts) endangered the 
pursuit of the superordinate goal (i.e., eliminating the total cost of debt). We think this 
effect occurred because the psychological gain from closing one of the debt accounts 
outweighed the financial loss from repayment of the less expensive debt. We attribute 
this finding to consumers’ lack of understanding about compound APR. Research 
demonstrates that consumers have difficulty understanding interest compounding (Stango 
and Zinman, 2009) or they underestimate the exponential growth of their debt (McKenzie 
and Liersch, 2011), especially when the consumer is not obligated to pay off their debt 
within a certain period. Policy makers should shift borrowers’ focus from immediate 
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outcomes to more distant outcomes by disclosing information that makes the future costs 
more salient. Particularly, existing elements of credit card statements can be revamped to 
assist consumers in calculating the compound interest in each billing cycle and convert it 
into dollar currency. This suggestion has yet to take place, but there has been some effort 
to increase consumers’ financial literacy. For example, U.S. Credit Card Accountability, 
Responsibility, and Disclosure (CARD) recently required lenders to display “Minimum 
Payment Warning” in all monthly credit cards statements. This warning discloses the 
total amount of money (principal plus interest) that will ultimately be paid if consumers 
only make minimum monthly payments. 
Additionally, this paper suggests that the deviation from rational debt payment 
will be attuned when debtors’ budgets are significantly less than the balance on the 
smallest card with the lowest APR. Although neither policy makers nor lenders can 
directly control an individual’s income level, they can promote consolidation offers to 
borrowers with multiple credit card debt to integrate their existing debt accounts into 
fewer, if not one, debt. By doing so, individuals not only can reduce the disutility of 
segregated debts and lower the overall interest rate, but they can also mitigate their 
vulnerability to pay off the most expensive debt (i.e., the debt with the smallest balance 
and the lowest APR). 
 
1.13.3 Managerial implications. The study of credit card debt management is 
equally important to financial institutions as it is to consumer researchers and policy 
makers. Lenders risk their assets because credit cards are unsecured loans. Creditors are 
keen to know how much potential interest they can earn from debtors and how 
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individuals prioritize payments in their debt portfolio. Our findings indicate that debt 
repayment depends upon the nature and the timing of the debt benefits. In particular, 
when debt benefits were satisfied in the past, people allocated their budget toward more 
hedonic-based debt than toward utilitarian-based debt. However, this preference reversed 
when consumption benefits were expected in the future. Credit card companies should 
create credit cards that promote hedonic and utilitarian consumptions differently. This is 
because the life span of hedonic consumption is typically very short when compared to 
utilitarian consumption (Voss et al., 2003) and people quickly adapt to it (Kahneman and 
Snell, 1990). In doing so, lenders can ensure that they can expedite the repayment of the 
credit card balance by moving up this balance in the hierarchy of customers’ debts. For 
example, customers are more tempted to use their Diners Club International credit card 
for travel and entertainment because they receive experiential rewards and unique 
frequent flyer miles. Since the hedonic benefits will depreciate quickly, the customers are 
more willing to pay the debt attributed to these type of consumption. Alternatively, Home 
Depot credit card rewards consumers with five points for home/garden improvements 
purchases and ten points for tools per every dollar spent. Since the nature of these 
purchases is utilitarian and the benefit of the purchase will be ongoing for many years, 
customers who incurred debt by using the Home Depot credit card will be more willing 
to pay off their debt.  
 
1.13.4 Directions for future research. Our research yields several interesting 
areas for future research. Our findings show that people try to reduce the total number of 
debt accounts, even though it is financially irrational. An interesting question left for 
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future research is whether individuals’ tendency to reduce the number of debt accounts 
would persist when they consider opening a new debt account. In addition, it would be 
insightful to find out whether the theories provided in this paper would apply similarly in 
the context of a decision to open a new debt account. For example, a customer visits an 
electronic store to buy a new digital camera to replace their old camera that no longer 
works. The new camera costs $300. The salesman asks the customer if he would like to 
open a new credit card with an interest rate of 4% APR to buy the new camera. Will the 
customer accept or decline this offer knowing that he owns two other debt accounts with 
higher interest rates, for instance 12% and 18%? Does the customer’s decision depend on 
the price of the item? Does the customer’s response differ if he can afford to pay the cost 
of the camera with cash? Will the outcome of the decision change if the consumer owns 
four debt accounts instead of two?   
Another topic for future research is the psychological differences that exist 
between the elimination of debt accounts and the consolidation of debt accounts. When 
individuals pay off one (or more) debt, the total amount of debt across all credit cards is 
reduced. However, when individuals consolidate many debt accounts into a fewer 
number of debt accounts, the total balance of the debt does not change. For example, 
when debt accounts were consolidated, Amar et al. (2011) found that the proportion of 
money suboptimally allocated toward a debt with the smallest balance and lowest APR 
was significantly decreased. On the contrary, we showed the reverse result, meaning that 
that the proportion of money allocated toward a debt with the smallest balance and lowest 
APR was significantly increased when the number of credit cards was reduced. As we 
pointed out earlier, these findings do not necessarily contradict each other. Rather, the 
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way debtors cognitively processed two debt scenarios was perhaps different. Further 
research is needed to shed light on these differences.  
Future research should also investigate the role of emotions in debt repayment 
decision more closely. The current paper discusses the psychology of the debt payment 
from the cognitive perspective and shows that debtors prioritize the repayment of the debt 
with the smallest balance and the lowest APR over the debt with the largest balance and 
the highest APR. While we discussed that this decision was irrational, we did not explore 
whether individuals already knew that their decision was irrational. They might have 
demonstrated this behavior because they received emotional benefits from their actions. 
Research shows that people regularly monitor their affective states in order to adjust them 
to more comfortable states.  More specifically, when people are in a negative emotional 
state, they generally want to feel better, and this decision becomes a proximal goal to 
initiate different activities to repair their mood (Tice et al., 2001). Additional research is 
warranted to tease out the cognitive and affective processes underlying the management 
of multiple debt accounts. 
 
1.13.5 Limitations. The present research was not without limitations. The first 
limitation is the nature of our sample. We used a convenient sampling method by 
recruiting undergraduate student subjects, and to that extent, we cannot generalize our 
findings to the general population. Although our respondents reported that they had a 
minimum of two credit cards and almost 65% of them were revolving their credit cards 
debt, our sample does not mimic the profile of the overall population who have credit 
cards debt. The second limitation is the nature of the stimuli. We employed scenario-
55 
 
based experiments and we did not measure participants’ actual credit cards debt. 
Although we controlled for individual’s overall knowledge about credit cards terms, it 
does not ensure that people have adequate debt management experience, especially in the 
exponential growth of interest compounding (McKenzie and Liersch, 2011). Third, we 
simplified the design of our credit card scenarios and did not communicate more detailed 
information such as due dates and credit limits for the credit cards. We suspect that 
individuals who carry debt accounts with different limits and due dates may prioritize 
their debt repayment differently. Finally, our findings from the second experiment 
regarding the nature and the timing of debt should be interpreted with caution. We 
manipulated the timing of the consumption benefits for a product that individuals did not 
possess at the time of the debt payment decision. In real life situations, however, people 
may incur future debt for a product that they currently own. For example, many sales 
promotion deals currently offer the zero cost of ownership to consumers and no debt 
payment is required until a certain point in future.      
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Essay 2: 
Saving by Overspending 
 
2.1 Overview 
 
There are various occasions where consumers prepay before a consumption 
decision. This paper suggests that under certain conditions, prepayment functions as a 
justification mechanism for temptation in the forms of overspending and indulgent 
consumption. Findings from two experiments indicate that monetary prepayments that 
are anticipated and are spent without consideration of consumption avoidance goals lead 
to the highest level of temptation. However, when consumption avoidance goals are 
accessible or a monetary prepayment incurs without anticipation, consumers are able to 
regulate their consumption and spending behavior. In addition, our results indicate that 
prepayments made with non-monetary resources, such as time and effort, substantially 
differ from monetary prepayments and, irrespective of their anticipation, yields to 
temptation. Pain of prepayment is suggested as the underlying process for these 
observations. 
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2.2 Introduction 
 
Mrs. Anderson works in an office in Manhattan, New York. Twice a week, 
Mrs. Anderson and her coworkers meet at a local bar for happy hour. The 
local bar charges a $10 entrance fee on Fridays, but it is free to enter 
during the rest of the week. Although the menu does not change on 
Fridays, Mrs. Anderson notices that her bill is more expensive on Fridays 
than any other day she visits the bar. 
 
The above scenario is not very rare. We often encounter very similar 
circumstances in our daily lives in which we make a prepayment before a consumption 
decision. In the back of our minds, we are trying to get our investment’s worth, when, in 
fact, we are just spending our money irrationally. This paper uses reason-based choice 
theory (Shafir et al., 1993) and affective restoration model (Tice et al., 2001) to indicate 
that prepayment toward a consumption goal may result in temptation in the forms of 
overspending (e.g., spending with no guilt) and indulgent consumption (e.g., choosing 
vice over virtue). This paper suggests that consumers are cognizant of the extra time, 
effort, and money they have to put forth in a monetary or non-monetary prepayment. 
Therefore, they will take actions to justify the cost of their investment, even if that means 
yielding to overspending and indulgent choice. 
Thaler (1980) suggests a mental accounting framework by which people code, 
categorize, and evaluate economic outcomes. Once the cost of payment is experienced, 
consumers create a mental account that functions as self-specified allowances and serves 
as a guide in evaluation (Cheema and Soman, 2006). Recent findings indicate that people 
can regulate their food consumption by assigning calories to different food categories.  
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Doing so makes the mental accounting more deliberate and the amount of consumed 
calories more salient (Krishnamurthy and Prokopec, 2010). Similarly, Raghubir and 
Srivastava (2008) demonstrate that the likelihood of spending is reduced when an 
equivalent sum of money is coded into a single mental account (e.g., one $20 bill) 
relative to many smaller mental accounts (e.g., 20 $1 bills). Further, the saliency of the 
payment may also draw people’s attention to the mental accounting rules, which in turn, 
results in spending (Soman, 2001) and consumption regulation (Thomas, Desai, and 
Seenivasan, 2011). For example, Soman (2001) demonstrates that people who pay with 
cash have better control over their expenditures compared to those who pay with a credit 
card. In that same vein, Thomas et al. (2011) find that the use of cash payments over 
credit cards strengthens impulse control and decreases unhealthy food decisions. This 
happens because customers’ assets deplete immediately and the disutility (pain) of 
payment is more salient with the cash payment as compared to the credit card payment in 
the mental account. 
Nevertheless, the exertion of self-control by the use of mental accounting is not a 
general rule and can be violated under certain circumstances. The violation of self-control 
principles are revealed with an impulsive decision about spending excessively and/or 
making an indulgent choice (Wilcox et al., 2009). This essay examines prepayment as 
one of the criterion through which the use of mental accounting, instead of regulating 
consumption and spending, may result in excessive spending and indulgent consumption. 
We offer both cognitive and affective explanations to account for this counter-intuitive 
effect.  
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First, from the cognitive standpoint, mental accounting principles are sometimes 
influenced by reason-based choices that seek to explain consumer preferences are based 
on reasoning (Kivetz, 1999; Kivetz and Simonson, 2002). Consumers often seek reasons 
to justify their choices (Shafir et al., 1993), especially when their decisions conflict with 
their personal values (e.g., spending on hedonic instead of utilitarian options). For 
example, Shafir and Thaler (2006) examine how wine collectors value wine that they 
originally purchased for $25 that now sells for $75. Their results indicate that most wine 
connoisseurs feel that consuming the wine costs them nothing. In fact, the justification of 
purchasing a $25 bottle of wine that can be sold for $75 facilitates individuals’ 
consumption decision. Similarly, Thaler (1985) argues that the purchase of a hedonic 
product is guilt-free when the decision is justified as an investment rather than as 
consumption. Therefore, we believe that reason-based decisions will counteract the pain 
of payment and restrictions on consumption and spending when prepayments are justified 
as investments toward a consumption goal. For example, a consumer who pays a $10 
V.I.P cover charge to enter a club will be more willing to spend money at the bar to 
justify the cost of the initial payment than a consumer who enters the club for free. This is 
because people who pay $10 will consider it as deserving that has been earned.  
Second, from the affective perspective, when an initial cost is incurred without the 
return of an immediate benefit, people experience negative feelings (Cheema and Soman, 
2008; Soman, 1998). Research indicates that people regularly monitor their affective 
states in order to adjust them to more comfortable states (Yi and Baumgartner, 2004). 
More specifically, the “affect restoration model” (Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeister, 
2001) notes that when people are in a negative emotional state, they generally want to 
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feel better, and this decision becomes a proximal goal to initiate different activities to 
repair their mood. Freedom from self-control is one method that subconsciously helps 
people to improve their mood and overcome their prior negative frame of mind 
(Baumeister, 2002). For example, Tice et al. (2001) empirically confirm that people who 
are in a sad mood are more likely to eat unhealthy foods as compared to those people 
who are in a neutral emotional state. Hence, people who make a prepayment and want to 
overcome their negative mood are more likely to regulate their mood by the means of 
indulgent consumption and over-spending than people who do not make a prepayment. 
In addition, this paper extends the concept of prepayments to currencies other 
than money. The total cost of consumption often entails a prepayment made with 
behavioral resources such as time or effort. For instance, consumers may spend some 
time and effort searching on the internet for the cheapest airline ticket before they book a 
flight. Existing literature suggests that individuals’ commitment to attain a planned 
decision escalates if they have already devoted resources to its attainment (Soster et al., 
2010; Monga and Saini, 2009). This robust phenomenon has been referred to as “sunk 
cost effect” and it usually results in suboptimal monetary and non-monetary decisions 
(Cunha and Caldieraro, 2009; Soman and Cheema, 2001).   
The current research proposes that similar to the monetary prepayment, 
prepayments made with behavioral resources would result in excessive spending and 
indulgent consumption. However, the magnitude of this effect compared to that of the 
monetary prepayment depends on the anticipation of prepayments. More specifically, 
when prepayment is anticipated prior to the consumption decision, we show that the sunk 
cost effect for behavioral prepayments is less than that for monetary prepayment. That is, 
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among people who anticipate prepayment, those who prepay with money are more 
inclined to overspend and indulge in subsequent decisions than individuals who prepay 
with behavioral resources. This proposition is consistent with the findings in the existing 
literature regarding the sunk cost effect in the realms of money, effort, and time (Soman, 
2001; Navarro and Fantino, 2009). However, when the prepayment toward a 
consumption decision is unanticipated, we propose the reverse pattern between the sunk 
cost effect of monetary and behavioral prepayments. As such, people tend to spend and 
indulge more in subsequent decisions when unanticipated prepayment was made with the 
behavioral currency than money. 
When people anticipate a prepayment toward a consumption goal, they open a 
mental budget as a self-allowance mechanism to track their expenses. Heath and Soll 
(1996) suggest that individuals who devote resources to the attainment of an outcome 
demonstrate the escalation of commitment by seeking benefits to recover the cost of their 
payment. Since people easily lose track of their behavioral investments (Ariely and 
Loewenstein, 2000; Soman, 2001) and the opportunity cost of behavioral resources is 
often neglected (Frederick et al., 2009), we propose that the magnitude of the sunk cost 
effect (i.e., the degree of failure to achieve the optimal decision) would be greater for a 
monetary than a non-monetary prepayment when consumers anticipate such payment 
prior to consumption. However, when prepayment is unanticipated, consumers do not 
create a designated mental account to regulate their future decisions after their budget is 
depleted (Thaler, 1985). This happens because consumers do not have time or cognitive 
resources to spontaneously create a mental account (Stilley et al., 2010). Heath (1995) 
asserts that investments which are easily tracked by individuals but they do not belong to 
68 
 
a mental budget result in de-escalation of commitment. That is, individuals are not 
tempted to seek additional benefits when an investment is easily managed but it does not 
fit into their mental budget limit. Hence, we suggest that the de-escalation of commitment 
only applies to monetary prepayment because the opportunity cost of money is more 
readily accessible from memory (Okada and Hoch, 2004) and individuals are better able 
to keep track of monetary costs (Soster et al., 2010). However, non-monetary investments 
are not subject to de-escalation of commitment because they are usually underestimated 
and not easy to track (Soman, 2001; Hoskin, 1983). For instance, customers who 
unexpectedly wait an hour to enter a club may subsequently indulge more at the bar than 
those who unexpectedly pay a $10 V.I.P cover charge, given that the average hourly 
wage is $10.  
 
2.3 Monetary Prepayment Violates Self-control 
 
Mental accounting is a method by which people regulate their consumption 
behavior (Soman, 2001; Heath and Soll, 1996). People open a dedicated mental account 
upon making a payment and close it when the consumption benefits are fully received 
(Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998). Consumers create arbitrary mental accounts as self-
specified allowances to ensure they will abide by their consumption/spending budget 
(Thaler, 1985). Cheema and Soman (2008) suggest that the partitioning of an aggregate 
quantity of a resource (e.g., food, money) draws people’s attention to the small 
transaction cost associated with each portion. As a result, since people open separate 
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mental accounts for each transaction, they are better able to control their consumption. 
For example, in the Weight Watchers program, each food is assigned a point value. 
Members are encouraged to limit their total daily consumption to a pre-specified number 
of points (Krishnamurthy and Prokopec, 2010). Similarly, Raghubir and Srivastava 
(2008) demonstrate that the likelihood of spending is reduced when an equivalent sum of 
money is presented with a big denomination (e.g., one $20 bill) relative to many small 
denominations (e.g., 20 $1 bills).  
There are numerous occasions wherein consumers commit to a consumption goal 
by making a monetary prepayment. Consumers may pay a $5 convenience fee to reserve 
a table at a restaurant, while others may pay a $10 V.I.P charge to enter a club to avoid 
waiting in line. However, contrary to the findings regarding the restrictive role of mental 
accounting on consumption and spending, our paper hypothesizes that when consumers 
make a prepayment toward a consumption goal, they lose self-control by means of 
overspending and choosing an indulgent choice. 
In the marketing domain, the loss of self-control is typically revealed via an 
impulsive decision about spending excessively and/or making an indulgent choice 
(Wilcox et al., 2009). While most people aim to spend their money wisely and avoid 
unnecessary expenses, they may indulge by overspending in an unplanned shopping 
situation (Hirschman, 1990). Alternatively, violation of self-control may appear in the 
form of choosing to consume hedonic products or “vices” (as opposed to utilitarian 
products or “virtues”) as the purchase or consumption of vices is harder to justify than 
that of virtues (Okada, 2005). Since the current literature attributes the sunk cost effect to 
cognitive (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Thaler, 1985) and affective (Wong and Kwong, 
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2007) reasons, we delineate the role of prepayment on the loss of self-control by the use 
of reason-based choice theory (Shafir et al., 1993) and the affective restoration model 
(Tice et al., 2001).  
First, from the cognitive perspective, reason-based choice theory (Shafir et al., 
1993) indicates that individuals often justify their actions, especially when the decision is 
complex (e.g., choosing between multiple attractive options) or it interferes with 
normative values (e.g., choosing a hedonic product over a utilitarian one). Research 
shows that the mental accounting process is subjective and consumers have flexibility in 
coding expenses to justify their spending (Cheema and Soman, 2006). The malleability of 
mental accounts allows individuals to participate in “creative book keeping” to justify 
their expenses and consumption habits. Consumers believe that they need a good reason 
to indulge in order to minimize the guilt and/or regret that they experience throughout the 
consumption decision (Kivetz and Zheng, 2006). There are numerous incidences 
regarding the dominance of the justification process over the mental accounting principle. 
Since people enjoy rewarding themselves for their altruistic behavior, Strahilevitz and 
Myers (1998) observed that donations to charities are better practiced with hedonic 
products or “vices” than with utilitarian products or “virtues.” 
Thaler (1985) argues that mental accounting rules are often abused to justify 
pleasurable consumption and do not actually restrain consumption. When justification 
rules dominate, decision makers are able to create a new mental account to justify their 
purchase. By doing so, consumers often create “guilt-free” zones for themselves to enjoy 
spending with no or little guilt (Thaler, 1985). In that same vein, Kivetz (1999) asserts 
that a reason-based decision may sometimes counteract the mental accounting principles 
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to eliminate restrictions on consumption and spending. Even consumers with hyperopia 
(e.g., farsightedness) often indulge when they have a compelling reason (Kivetz and 
Zheng, 2006). Since a decision maker has an internal need to justify prior investments to 
avoid considering them as wasteful (Schaubroeck and Davis, 1994), we believe this 
desire to compensate for the perceived loss of a prepayment guides individuals toward 
overspending and indulgent consumption compared to those who did not make a 
prepayment (e.g., “I deserve to be easy on myself tonight because I already paid to enter 
the club”). 
Alternatively, from the affective standpoint, Brenner et al. (2007) find that people 
may close a mental account to negate negative emotions. By doing so, they create a 
psychological gain that helps them to manage potential future losses (Fishbach and 
Labroo, 2007). Further, the affect restoration model (Tice et al., 2001) indicates that 
when people are in a negative emotional state, they generally want to feel better. This 
desire becomes a proximal goal to initiate different activities to repair their mood (Labroo 
and Patrick, 2009). People regularly monitor their affective states to adjust them to more 
comfortable circumstances (Yi and Baumgartner, 2004). When people are upset, the goal 
of feeling better precipitates the goal of regulating behavior. Tice et al. (2001) 
demonstrate that people who are in a sad mood are more likely to eat unhealthy foods 
compared to those people in a neutral emotional state. Yielding to temptation may help 
people to improve their mood and overcome their prior negative state of mind (Yi and 
Baumgartner, 2004). Moreover, Schaller and Cialdini (1990) confirm that negative 
emotions induce a motivational drive to restore one’s mood. Therefore, this paper 
proposes that negative emotions evoked by prepayment can be neutralized through 
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overspending and indulgent consumption. For example, if a person, upon his arrival, is 
charged a $10 valet parking fee to go to his favorite restaurant, he will spend more money 
on food to make up for the fact that he paid $10 to get into the restaurant. Accordingly, 
we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: People who make a prepayment toward a consumption goal are more 
likely to lose self-control than people who do not make a prepayment. 
 
Recently, Krishnamurthy and Prokopec (2010) demonstrate that mental accounts 
regulate impulsive consumption successfully when they are combined with consumption 
avoidance goals. In their study, participants imagined a shopping trip during which they 
were offered tempting desserts for free. The avoidance goal was activated either by 
asking subjects to think about reasons not to engage in the consumption or by framing the 
decision in terms of choosing versus rejecting. Their findings indicate that mental 
accounting is only effective for the exertion of self-control when avoidance goals are 
accessible. Given Krishnamurthy and Prokopec (2010)’s findings, one should expect the 
temptation justification for prepayment to disappear when the avoidance aspect of 
consumption behavior is made accessible. In other words, we propose that when 
individuals are informed about the negative consequences of impulsive consumption, 
they would restrain from temptation. 
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H2: The temptation for people who prepay toward a consumption goal is 
attenuated when the consumption avoidance goal is present. 
 
2.4 Prepayment Currencies and Loss of Self-control 
 
People open a dedicated mental budget for their investment and track it against 
their budget (Thaler, 1985). When an investment toward a goal is anticipated, people set 
their mental budget such that the cost of the investment can be accommodated. For 
example, a consumer who decides to go to a steakhouse restaurant on a date would 
consider designating a mental account worth $100 for his dining costs. Existing literature 
suggests that individuals’ commitment to attain a planned decision escalates if they have 
already devoted resources to its attainment (Monga and Saini, 2009). This phenomenon is 
known as “sunk cost effect” and it usually results in suboptimal monetary and non-
monetary decisions (Cunha and Caldieraro, 2009; Soman and Cheema, 2001). Heath and 
Soll (1996) suggest that when an investment falls below or meets the limit of a mental 
budget, it escalates the sunk cost effect. As such, individuals seek benefits to recover the 
cost of their payment. 
A new stream of research has recently evolved that examines the effect of 
behavioral investments such as time (Okada and Hoch, 2004) and effort (Mogilner and 
Aaker, 2009) on consumers’ perception and decision making. While sunk cost effect is 
most apparent in the context of financial decisions, Navarro and Fantino (2009) suggest 
that sunk cost effect also emerges with behavioral investments. That is, in the absence of 
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any explicit monetary payments, people seek to obtain rewards from the time they spend 
on a task (Rajagopal and Rha, 2009). Similarly, Soster et al. (2010) find that when people 
use the same mental accounting period for both money and time, sunk cost effects are 
observed for both. Further, Kivetz (2005) extends the mental accounting principles to 
effort as the currency of a transaction. He notes that there is a congruity between the 
rewards that individuals choose and the amount of consumption effort they devote to a 
task. By choosing an effort-congruent reward, consumers establish their consumption 
behavior to reflect their preferences in return for the amount of effort they invested prior 
to the consumption.  
People tend to plan better and spend their money more wisely for their monetary 
investments than for behavioral investments (Ziberman and Lynch, 2005; Hirschman, 
1990). Also, research shows that people keep track of their monetary investments and 
consider their opportunity costs more so than behavioral resources (Frederick et al., 
2009). Overall, the consensus is that while mental accounting can be constructed for time 
and effort (Kivetz and Zheng, 2006; Monga and Saini, 2009), the sunk cost effect of 
behavioral investments are weaker than that of monetary investments (Soman, 2001; 
Zauberman and Lynch, 2005). The reason is that individuals either fail to calculate the 
equivalent monetary costs of time and effort when unstated (Neumann and Friedman, 
1980) or they underestimate them when prompted (Hoskin, 1983). In other words, when 
people invest behavioral resources, they notice the pain of investment, but they are less 
sensitive to their loss when compared to a monetary investment (Cunha and Caldieraro, 
2009). Hence, we propose that the loss of self-control caused by prepayment would be 
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greater for an anticipated monetary prepayment than for an anticipated non-monetary 
prepayment. 
 
H3a: When a prepayment is anticipated, people who prepay with money 
are more likely to lose self-control than those who prepay with time which 
is comparable to that money. 
 
H3b: When a prepayment is anticipated, people who prepay with money 
are more likely to lose self-control than those who prepay with effort 
which is comparable to that money. 
 
Money is a typical currency for transactions and it keeps its face value in an 
exchange. Therefore, it is easy to assign a monetary payment to a corresponding mental 
account (Soman, 2001). Conversely, people easily lose track of time (Ariely and 
Loewenstein, 2000) and choices are not temporally driven (Ebert and Prelec, 2007). The 
opportunity cost of money can be readily calculated and is approximately constant across 
varying situations (Hirschman, 1990). However, the opportunity cost of time and effort 
are often neglected (Frederick et al., 2009).  
Heath (1995) argues that when an investment is easy to keep track of but it 
exceeds the limit of a mental budget, a reverse sunk cost effect may occur. It means that 
people who have devoted their resources toward the attainment of a goal, they resist the 
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pursuit of that goal. He refers to this behavior as de-escalation of commitment. In this 
case, people are not willing to justify a previous investment that appears to have been a 
loss. When consumers make an unexpected payment, they do not create a designated 
mental account so that they can regulate their future decisions when their budget is 
depleted (Thaler, 1985). This happens because consumers do not have time or cognitive 
resources to spontaneously create a mental account (Stilley et al., 2010). Therefore, when 
people make an unanticipated monetary prepayment that is not encoded into a mental 
account, we propose that they would exercise self-control as a result of a reverse sunk 
cost effect. For instance, a person who expects to pay a $10 admission fee to a festival, 
but ends up paying $20, may constrain his spending at the festival to make up for the 
unanticipated sunk cost. 
Alternatively, when people experience difficulty in setting mental budgets and the 
investments are not easily traceable, the escalation of commitment emerges (Heath, 
1995). When people make an unanticipated behavioral prepayment, we believe that the 
sunk cost effect still persists due to the difficulty in constructing a representative mental 
account, and consequently, tracking the behavioral investment (Okada and Hoch, 2004). 
Cheema and Soman (2006) note the malleability of mental accounting. They find that 
people are flexible when assigning expenses to different mental accounts when they are 
faced with ambiguous expenses such as time or effort. Cunha and Caldieraro (2009) 
believe that investing behavioral resources without an instant reward is an undesirable 
cognitive and emotional task. Similarly, Kivetz and Zheng (2006) note that hard work or 
entitlement justifies self-gratification. In this case, individuals are convinced that they 
have worked beyond their expectations and they deserve a reward. Therefore, they 
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choose to boost the enjoyment and desirability of their decision by relaxing their 
consumption regulation (Kivetz and Simonson, 2002). For instance, when a restaurant 
has an unanticipated wait, a consumer who does not pay valet and waits for 50 minutes to 
be seated may choose more indulgent food than a consumer who pays $10 valet to be 
seated right away. Therefore, we hypothesize the followings: 
 
H4a: When a prepayment is unanticipated, people who prepay with effort 
are more likely to lose self-control than those who prepay with money 
which is comparable to that effort.  
 
H4b: When a prepayment is unanticipated, people who prepay with time 
are more likely to lose self-control than those who prepay with money 
which is comparable to that time. 
 
2.5 Why Do These Effects Occur? 
 
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) suggests that people are more 
sensitive to losses than to corresponding gains relative to their current reference point. 
That is, for the equivalent gain and loss, the loss will be accentuated relative to the 
corresponding gain and the net utility will be negative. Payment represents a potential 
loss, especially when the benefits are not immediately sought (Thaler, 1980). Prelec and 
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Lowenstein (1998) believe that people feel pain when making a payment, especially 
when their payment is loosely decoupled from consumption. The pain of payment 
associated with depleted resources may remain in the individuals’ mind until that mental 
account is closed (Soman, 2001). The potential pleasure of consumption and the pain of 
payment are even supported by neuroscientific evidence (Knutson et al. 2007). In 
particular, this stream of research suggests that individuals have immediate affective 
reactions to potential gain and loss that indicate the outcome of a purchase decision. The 
pain of payment represents the overall negative feelings of parting with valuable 
resources and is largely determined by the nature of the invested resources (Thomas et 
al., 2011). 
Prelec and Lowenstein (1998) confirm that paying with cash elicits a greater sunk 
cost effect than paying with other modes of payment. Similarly, Soman (2001) indicates 
that the pain of payment is immediate in the case of cash payment, whereas the pain is 
attenuated in the case of credit card payment. In the case of a cash payment, the pain of 
payment is noticeable as customers’ assets deplete immediately from the mental account. 
However, the payment disutility from a credit card payment is less salient and less 
traceable in the mental account. Further, Raghubir and Srivastava (2008) extend the 
notion of the pain of payment to spending behavior. According to their findings, people 
who use currencies in which the pain of payment was not salient (e.g., $50 voucher 
instead of $50 bill) spend more while shopping. 
Thaler (1985) suggests that all types of investments create negative feelings, but 
with different intensity. Payments that are transparent in nature (e.g., cash) are more 
painful than payments that may not feel or appear as real (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998). 
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In other words, reducing the salience of parting with resources psychologically reduces 
the barrier to spend. Although behavioral and monetary investments are inherently 
different, findings confirm that individuals experience negative affect with different 
intensities when these resources are depleted (Monga and Saini, 2009; Soster et al., 
2010). Consistent with the current literature, this paper proposes that the pain associated 
with prepayment (e.g., the negative feelings of parting with valuable resources) is the 
mechanism causing indulgence. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the interaction between 
the currencies (e.g., time, effort, or money) and the anticipation of prepayment will 
ultimately lead to the loss of self-control based upon the pain experienced after making a 
prepayment. 
 
H5: The interaction between the currencies and the anticipation of 
prepayment on the propensity to lose self-control is significantly mediated 
by the pain of payment. 
 
2.6 Overview of Studies 
 
In summary, this paper proposes that making a monetary prepayment toward a 
consumption goal causes people to lose self-control in the forms of overspending and 
indulgent consumption. In addition, this research extends the currency of prepayment to 
other contexts such as time and effort. It hypothesizes that consumers’ temptation 
80 
 
increases (decreases) when consumers do not anticipate (anticipate) prepaying with 
effort-based or temporal-based resources compared to monetary resources.  
Two experiments are designed to examine these predictions. Experiment 1 uses a 
scenario study to test H1 and H2. Subjects read a scenario about making a monetary 
prepayment for a food festival. Then, they indicate their preference for various types of 
snacks and the amount of money they are willing to pay for their selected snacks at the 
event. We propose that people, who make a prepayment and are not primed with a 
consumption avoidance goal, demonstrate the highest level of self-indulgence and 
overspending. 
In the second experiment, we test H3a, H3b, H4a, and H4b, as well as the 
underlying process, H5, in a service context. Participants are provided with a situation of 
attending a restaurant and making prepayment with different currencies (e.g., money, 
time, or effort) to enter the restaurant. Then, they are asked to list the type of appetizers 
that they would like to order. We propose that when the prepayment is anticipated, people 
who prepay with money are more willing to overspend and indulge than individuals who 
prepay with behavioral resources comparable to that money. Conversely, we expect to 
find the opposite effect when prepayments are unanticipated. Also, we show that the 
perceived pain of prepayment is the underlying process for the loss of self-control. 
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2.7 Experiment 1 
 
 Experiment 1 tests the prediction that making a prepayment shifts people’s 
preference toward more vice choices and increases the amount of expenditures for a 
consumption goal. However, we propose that this effect only holds when consumption 
avoidance goals are not primed. This means that when subjects are asked to think of 
reasons to avoid engaging in a consumption behavior, the preference for vice over virtue 
and overspending tendency diminishes. 
 
2.7.1 Design, participants, and procedure. This experiment is a 2 (prepayment: 
no vs. yes) x 2 (consumption avoidance goal: present vs. absent) between subjects 
factorial design. One hundred fifty-two undergraduate students were recruited from a 
public, southern U.S. university to participate in this experiment in exchange for partial 
course credit (Mage=22.37 years, SD=4.58; males=75 and females=77). A total of seven 
individuals were later excluded from the analyses as they either failed the manipulation 
check or they did not finish the survey completely. Subjects completed an online survey 
and were randomly assigned to one of four possible scenarios. The first three pages of the 
study were common to all conditions. They described the purpose of the study and asked 
for consent to participate in it. The scenario asked subjects to imagine that they would be 
spending a day at an event that featured international food. Then, participants were told 
that they decided to purchase a snack from one of the nearby food kiosks and were 
offered sixteen snack options. Eight snacks in the list were unhealthy (chocolate bar, 
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Chips Ahoy cookies, cheese curls, Doritos chips, ice cream, doughnuts, Oreos, and fruit 
roll-ups) and the remainder eight snacks were healthy (raisins, celery sticks, cheerios, low 
fat yogurt, baby carrots, granola bar, rice cake, and apple). The list of snacks was adopted 
from Laran (2010). Participants were asked to choose only one snack from the list. The 
target decisions were about whether they chose a healthy (virtue) or unhealthy (vice) 
option and how much they are willing to pay for their selected snack. The scenario for the 
no prepayment conditions without priming the consumption avoidance goal was as 
follows. Please note that the words in the brackets denote the conditions to which the 
participants were randomly assigned. 
 
“Imagine that you are at Disney’s Food & Wine Festival. This annual 
autumn event features international kiosks offering a variety of tasty 
appetizers and refreshing beverages. The admission to this event is free 
[$10]. At the event, you decide to buy a snack from one of the nearby 
kiosks. Please choose the snack you would like to have from the list on the 
next page.” 
 
The key difference in the avoidance goal manipulation was that people who were 
primed with the consumption avoidance goal were asked to consider and document the 
reasons to avoid engaging in consumption behavior prior to reading the main scenario. In 
particular, we told subjects the following: “Often times, people feel like wanting TO 
AVOID EATING snacks. Can you please list below the reasons that come to your mind 
that make you want TO AVOID EATING snacks?” Underneath this statement, there was 
a box that participants were able to list their thoughts. Those for whom the consumption 
avoidance goal was absent only saw the main scenario.  
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After participants indicated their snack choice and the amount they were willing 
to pay, we asked them to write down their rationale for their snack choice. We 
specifically asked them to be as detailed as possible when reflecting their thoughts. Based 
on the mental accounting theory (Thaler, 1980), a mental account helps a decision maker 
to focus on the most salient goal. When the consumption avoidance goal is not primed, 
people’s attention is mainly drawn to the prepayment sunk cost. As such, individuals may 
choose vice over virtue and spend frivolously to overcome the negative emotions elicited 
from prepayment. Alternatively, when the consumption avoidance goal is made salient, 
we expect the participant to stay focused on goals that encourage them to avoid 
consumption. In other words, they use the open mental budget dedicated to prepayment 
as the regulating mechanism to achieve their avoidance goal (Krishnamurthy and 
Prokopec, 2010). Thus, when the consumption avoidance goal is absent, the prepayment 
should lead to an increase in thoughts concerned with the sunk cost. In contrast, when the 
consumption avoidance goal is made salient, the prepayment should increase the 
incidence of health-related thoughts. 
In the last page of the survey, we asked participants to answer manipulation check 
questions and to rate the believability of the scenario, their level of involvement, and their 
healthy eating habits. We also recorded participants’ gender and level of hunger while 
taking the survey. 
 
2.7.2 Independent variables 
 2.7.2.1 Prepayment. All participants first read a short description in which 
they were told that they had attended an international food festival. In the prepayment 
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condition, participants were told that the admission fee to this event was $10. However, 
in the no prepayment conditions, subjects were informed that the admission to this event 
was free. Thus, we initiated a mental account by telling one group of participants that the 
cost of admission to an event was $10. We assume that people would choose more vice 
(unhealthy) snacks to justify the cost of the prepayment. Alternatively, participants in the 
no prepayment condition did not incur any admission cost and, consequently, their snack 
choices should not be driven by the negative utility of the prepayment. 
  
 2.7.2.2 Consumption avoidance goal. A consumption avoidance goal similar 
to Krishnamurthy and Prokopec (2010) was primed by asking one group of participants 
to consider and write down reasons to avoid eating snacks. In the case where the 
consumption avoidance goal was absent, subjects did not see the above statements and 
were immediately directed to the main prepayment scenario. 
 
2.7.3 Dependent variables 
 2.7.3.1 Choice of snack. Participants selected a snack from a list of sixteen 
snacks developed by Laran (2010). Half of snacks were unhealthy, whereas the other half 
were healthy. We pretested this list with a group of undergraduate students (n=17). Our 
results indicated that the snacks, on average, were equally preferred (Mhealthy=4.58 vs. 
Munhealthy=4.71; F <1). In addition, the group of healthy and unhealthy snacks served their 
purpose properly, measured on a 7-point (1=very unhealthy and 7=very healthy) semantic 
differential scale (Mhealthy=4.92 vs. Munhealthy=2.64; F (1, 16) =85.32, p<.05). Participants 
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were asked to only choose one snack. This choice could have one of two possible values, 
indicating whether the snack was healthy (coded 0) or unhealthy (coded 1). 
 
 2.7.3.2 Willingness to pay. After participants indicated their snack choice, 
they were asked how much they were willing to pay for their snack. Findings from the 
same pretest indicated that the cost of healthy snacks, on average, were estimated to be 
about the same as the unhealthy snacks (Mhealthy=$2.31 vs. Munhealthy=$3.01; F (1, 16) 
=3.67, p>.05). 
 
2.7.4 Process evidence. To gain additional insight into the process leading to 
overspending and indulgence after people prepay, we analyzed the cognitive responses 
(i.e., the comments that respondents wrote about their thought process after they chose 
their snack in the survey). Each reason in the thought protocol was coded as being health-
focused, pleasure-focused, or sunk cost-focused. Our prediction is that overspending and 
indulgent consumption (e.g., choosing vice over virtue) is based on the logic that mental 
accounting assists individuals in pursuing the most salient goal (Krishnamurthy and 
Prokopec, 2010). If this is true, when the consumption avoidance goal is absent, we 
predict that people who prepay would report more thoughts pertinent to the sunk cost 
than people who do not prepay. This is because they want to close the mental account 
dedicated to the prepayment by actively choosing snack options that elicit positive 
emotions. Conversely, when the consumption avoidance goal is activated, people who 
make a prepayment are more inclined to refer to health-related thoughts than people who 
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do not prepay. We believe this happens because the mental account assigned to the 
prepayment will assist individuals to focus on the pursuit of the most salient goal which 
is consumption avoidance.  
 
2.7.5 Covariates. We measured healthy eating habits by averaging five 7-point 
Likert or semantic differential scales developed by Krishnamurthy and Prokopec (2010) 
that measured whether participants watched what they ate (disagree/agree), the 
importance they gave to eating healthy (not at all important/very important), whether they 
were on a diet (not on a diet/on a diet), their consumption of fruits/veggies (eat less of/eat 
more of), and the extent to which they tried to choose low-calorie foods (disagree/agree). 
These items were found to be highly reliable (Cronbach’s alpha=.91). Additionally, we 
controlled for participants’ gender, hunger during the survey, and their level of 
involvement with the scenario. Feeling of hunger was measured on a 7-point semantic 
differential scale by asking respondents to indicate to what extent they were hungry while 
taking the survey (not at all hungry/very hungry). The level of involvement with the task 
was also measured by averaging four 7-point semantic differential scales adopted from 
Wang and Calder (2006). These items were also found to be highly reliable (Cronbach’s 
alpha=.89). However, only the healthy eating measure and gender revealed a significant 
influence and were controlled for in subsequent analyses. 
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2.7.6 Results 
 2.7.6.1 Manipulation check. We assessed the success of the manipulation of 
the prepayment and the consumption avoidance conditions with two questions at the end 
of the survey. First, we asked people in a multiple-choice question to select the amount 
that they paid to enter the festival. As was expected, people in the no prepayment 
condition chose the “free admission” option, whereas all subjects, except two, in the 
prepayment condition chose the “$10 admission fee” option. Second, the effectiveness of 
the avoidance goal priming was measured by comparing the proportion of pleasure-
focused thoughts generated by each group across prepayment conditions. Individuals in 
the salient consumption avoidance goal reported a significantly less number of pleasure-
focused concerns than did subjects when consumption avoidance goal was absent 
(M=0.12 vs. M=.28, F (1, 139) =6.31, p<.05). Therefore, we concluded that the priming 
of the avoidance goal was successful. Since no one correctly guessed the purpose of the 
study, responses from a total of 143 subjects, who met the above criteria, were used for 
further analyses. 
 
 2.7.6.2 Support for H1and H2. A two-way analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) was performed with two levels of monetary prepayment (present vs. absent) 
crossed with two levels of the consumption avoidance mechanism (present vs. absent) as 
between-subjects independent variables. The dependent variable was the amount that 
people reported they were willing to pay for their snack. Healthy eating habits and gender 
were also entered as covariates in the model. 
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Our results demonstrated a significant main effect of prepayment (F (1, 139) 
=7.67, p<.05) such that those who prepaid for the event were willing to spend more on 
their desired snack (M=$4.03) when compared to those who entered the event for free 
(M=$3.34). However, no significant main effect of the consumption avoidance goal on 
the willingness to pay was observed. This means that a willingness to pay for the snack 
did not significantly differ between people who were primed with the consumption 
avoidance goal (M=$3.62) and individuals who were not (M=$3.75; F (1, 139) =1.26, 
p>.05). In addition, these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction. The 
avoidance goal and prepayment interaction (F (1, 139) =22.35, p<.05) confirmed that a 
willingness to pay difference between the prepayment conditions was significantly 
greater when the avoidance goal was absent (M=$2.13) than it was present (M=$.56). 
Planned contrasts revealed a significant increase in a willingness to pay for the 
snack when the consumption avoidance goal was absent such that willingness to pay was 
higher (F (1, 68) =32.04, p<.05) when people prepaid to enter the event (M=$5.06) 
compared to when they did not (M=$2.93). This finding supports H1 and H2 when 
overspending is considers as a proxy to temptation. As such, when the avoidance aspect 
of the behavior was not primed, people who prepaid toward a consumption goal were 
more likely to spend than people who did not prepay. However, when the avoidance 
aspect of behavior was activated, the difference in willingness to spend on the snack 
choice between two prepayment conditions disappeared (Mprepayment=$3.40 vs. Mno-
prepayment=$3.96; F (1, 71) =1.73, p=.19>.05). Figure 4 depicts the above results. 
To examine the loss of self-control in the context of snack choice, a logistic 
regression analysis was performed with the monetary prepayment (present vs. absent) and 
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the consumption avoidance mechanism (present vs. absent) as predictors. The dependent 
variable was the binary choice between an unhealthy or healthy type of snack. Similar to 
the ANCOVA analysis, healthy eating habits, gender, task involvement, and hunger 
during the survey were added to the model as control variables. 
 
 
Figure 4. The influence of prepayment and avoidance goal on willingness to spend on a 
snack 
 
A logistic regression analysis indicated a significant prepayment by avoidance 
goal interaction (Wald=13.61, p<.05), in addition to a significant main effect of the 
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consumption avoidance goal (Wald=10.55, p<.05). In support of H1 and H2, when the 
consumption avoidance goal was absent, making a prepayment toward a consumption 
goal resulted in an increase in the choice of the unhealthy snack (85.20% when the 
prepayment was made compared to 41.90% when there was no prepayment; z=3.58, p 
<05).  
 
 
Figure 5. The influence of prepayment and avoidance goal on preference for an 
unhealthy snack 
 
Moreover, when the prepayment was made, the preference for the unhealthy 
snack was higher when the avoidance goal was absent (85.20%) than when it was present 
(36.40%; z=4.01, p<.05). However, when no prepayment was made to enter the festival, 
the preference for the unhealthy snack did not significantly vary across the two avoidance 
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goal conditions (41.90% vs. 48.30% in the absence and presence of the avoidance goal 
conditions, respectively; z<1, p=.59>.05). Figure 5 illustrates these results. 
 
 2.7.6.3 Process evidence. Following the thought protocol procedure discussed 
earlier, we classified the cognitive responses of individuals regarding their snack 
selection into health-focused (e.g., “I am very careful about what I eat”) and pleasure-
focused (e.g., “I love ice cream. This is the best option in a food festival.”), or sunk cost-
focused (e.g., “I paid to get in so why not treat myself to a yummy snack?”) thoughts. 
Then, we carried out three separate ANOVAs to evaluate how the number of health-
related, pleasure-related and sunk-cost related thoughts varied across the prepayment and 
avoidance goal conditions. 
With respect to the incidence of health-focused thoughts, a significant main effect 
of the consumption avoidance goal (M=0.64 vs. M=.31, F (1, 139) =11.55, p<.05) as well 
as a two-way interaction between the prepayment and the consumption avoidance goal (F 
(1, 139) =12.62, p<.05) was observed. Planned contrast showed that when the 
consumption avoidance goal was absent, there was no difference between the prepayment 
and no-prepayment condition in terms of the number of health-related thoughts 
(Mprepayment=.26 vs. Mno-prepayment=.37; F (1, 68) <1). However, when the consumption 
avoidance goal was present, those who prepaid for an event reported a significantly 
higher number of health-related thoughts than those who did not prepay 
(Mprepayment=.83vs. Mno-prepayment=.46; F (1, 71) =5.73, p<.05). This finding supports our 
assumption that a mental account will assist individuals to pursue the most salient goal.   
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When we analyzed the number of sunk cost thoughts, we observed a significant 
main effect of prepayment (Mprepayment=.61vs. Mno-prepayment=.25; F (1, 139) =5.69, p<.05), 
as well as a two-way interaction between the prepayment and the avoidance goal (F (1, 
139) =12.62, p<.05). Particularly, a planned contrast indicated that within the 
consumption avoidance salient condition, there was no difference between the 
prepayment and no-prepayment condition in terms of the number of sunk cost-related 
thoughts (Mprepayment=.32 vs. Mno-prepayment=.26; F (1, 71) <1). However, when the 
consumption avoidance goal was absent, those who prepaid for an event reported a 
significantly higher number of sunk cost-focused thoughts than those who did not prepay 
(Mprepayment=.83 vs. Mno-prepayment=.34; F (1, 68) =7.41, p<.05).  
Our analysis for the incidence of pleasure-focused thoughts only revealed a 
significant main effect of avoidance goal conditions. That is, individuals in the salient 
consumption avoidance goal reported a significantly a fewer number of pleasure-focused 
concerns than did subjects when consumption avoidance goal was absent (M=0.12 vs. 
M=.28, F (1, 139) =6.31, p<.05). Planned contrasts showed that no difference between 
the prepayment and no-prepayment condition in terms of the number of pleasure-related 
thoughts in the presence of avoidance goal (Mprepayment=.31 vs. Mno-prepayment=.26; F (1, 71) 
<1) and the absence of avoidance goal existed (Mprepayment=.11 vs. Mno-prepayment=.14; F (1, 
68) <1).  
In summary, we concluded that the cost of prepayment increased people’s 
propensity to choose unhealthier snacks when the consumption avoidance goal was not 
primed. However, when the avoidance goal was activated, the tendency toward choosing 
an unhealthy snack disappeared. 
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2.7.7 Discussion. Results from the first study lend support to H1 and H2. More 
specifically, we demonstrated that when the avoidance aspect of consumption behavior 
was absent, individuals who prepaid had a higher tendency to indulge (e.g., choosing vice 
over virtue) and overspend than those who did not make a prepayment. While mental 
accounting generally works as a reference point to regulate consumption behavior 
(Soman, 2001; Thaler, 1985), our findings indicate that mental accounting, dedicated to 
the cost of prepayment, resulted in indulgent consumption and spending decisions. Our 
thought protocols revealed that the sunk costs of prepayment caused this anomaly. 
Participants sought immediate rewards after prepayment to feel satisfied in order to close 
their mental accounts. This result is consistent with the finding by Fishbach and Labroo 
(2007) that adding a psychological gain is one way that consumers can suppress the 
negative utility of an action. 
Further, our results showed that priming individuals with an avoidance goal 
significantly enhanced their self-control in consumption. We found that when a 
prepayment coincided with an avoidance goal, individuals were better able to monitor 
their consumption and spending behavior. This finding reflects the role of mental 
accounting in helping decision makers to stay focused on their salient goals 
(Krishnamurthy and Prokopec, 2010). That is, a prepayment did not create a deviation 
from normal consumption behavior; rather, it facilitated individuals’ pursuit of the 
avoidance goal. As a result, individuals reported a significantly higher number of health-
focused thoughts when the consumption avoidance goal was present than did those 
subjects where consumption avoidance goal was absent. 
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In Study 1, we argued that prepayment and the saliency of the avoidance goal 
influenced consumption and spending behavior. In Study 2, however, we explore other 
factors that moderate the influence of prepayment on indulgent consumption. More 
specifically, we investigate whether different types of prepayment (e.g., temporal, effort-
based, and monetary) and the anticipation of the prepayment would influence people’ 
consumption decision. In addition, we reproduce the mediating role of sunk cost thoughts 
generated from prepayment on indulgent consumption by measuring the pain of payment. 
 
2.8 Experiment 2 
 
 Experiment 1 only focused on monetary prepayment. However, experiment 2 
examines the prediction that people often prepay with other currencies and they may treat 
a non-monetary prepayment differently than a monetary prepayment. In particular, this 
study examines whether the sunk cost effect of monetary and non-monetary (e.g., in the 
form of time or effort) prepayments varies as a function of individuals’ anticipation of the 
prepayment. When a prepayment is unanticipated, a behavioral prepayment shifts 
people’s preference more toward indulgent (vice) choices than a monetary prepayment 
does. This prediction is based on the notion of de-escalation of commitment that only 
occurs to monetary prepayments. Conversely, when a prepayment is anticipated, we 
expect the difference between monetary and non-monetary prepayment for indulgent 
consumption to flip. We propose that this reversal effect occurs because when both 
monetary and non-monetary prepayments are anticipated, they are subject to escalation of 
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commitment. The pain of payment is discussed as the underlying process leading to 
indulgent behavior and, especially, the proposed difference among three sources of 
prepayment. 
 
2.8.1 Pretests. The experiment involved scenarios in which people imagined 
prepaying with different currencies, namely money, time, and effort. We carried out 
several pretests to ensure equivalence of these resources. First, we told a group of 
undergraduate students (n=19) to imagine they had left their IDs in a car parked four 
blocks from a club that they wanted to enter. Then, they decided to pay a valet staff to go 
and get their IDs from the car. We asked subjects to indicate how much they were willing 
to pay the valet staff for his effort (M=$11.46, SD=1.82). This value was found to be not 
significantly different than $12 used in the next pretest (t (1, 18) =.12, p>.05). 
Another group of undergraduate students (n=20) imagined they had gone to a club 
that was free for individuals who waited in line, but it charged $12 VIP for immediate 
admission. Participants were asked to indicate how long they were willing to wait in line 
to avoid paying $12 cover charge (M=47.64 minutes, SD= 12.05). Again, this value was 
shown to be not significantly different than 50 minutes (t (1, 19) =.84, p>.05). Finally, we 
confirmed the conversion rate among three prepayment currencies by asking another 
group of students (n=17) to estimate how much a valet parking staff makes per hour 
(M=$15.2, SD=2.23). This value did not significantly differ from $12 for 50 minutes of 
service (t (1, 16) =.73, p>.05). Based on the results of these pretests, we created our 
experiment scenarios in the context of a service provider such that the equivalent 
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prepayments with money ($12), time (50 minutes), and effort (walk eight blocks) would 
be applicable. 
 
2.8.2 Design, participants, and procedure. This experiment is a 3 (prepayment 
currency: money vs. time vs. effort) x 2 (prepayment: anticipated vs. unanticipated) 
between subject factorial design with an additional control condition. Two hundred seven 
undergraduate students from the same university participated in this experiment in 
exchange for partial course credit (Mage=21.52 years, SD=4.17; males=99 and 
females=97). A total of eleven responses were deleted from further analyses as they 
either failed the manipulation checks or they were incomplete. Unlike the treatment 
conditions, the control group participants were exposed to neither the prepayment nor the 
anticipation of prepayment manipulation information. The rationale for adding this 
control group was to examine whether prepayment in any format would result in 
indulgent consumption.   
An online survey with seven scenarios (one for the control group and six for the 
treatment conditions) was created and respondents were randomly assigned to one of the 
conditions. The first three pages of the study were common to all conditions. They 
described the purpose of the study and asked subjects for their consent to participate in it. 
Next, participants imagined that they were going to a popular restaurant. In a between 
subject design, subjects were informed that due to high demand, they had to pay an 
admission fee ($12), wait in line (50 minutes), or make a certain effort (walk eight 
blocks) to enter the restaurant. In addition, the prepayment information was conveyed 
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such that it gave participants the impression that prepayment was either anticipated or 
unanticipated. Then, participants imagined that they entered the restaurant and decided to 
order. In particular, unlike Study 1 where we provided the snack choices, we asked 
participants to write down the appetizers they would like to order. We were interested to 
assess whether subjects’ preference (healthy vs. unhealthy dessert) and the degree of 
willingness to pay varied across experiment conditions. For example, the scenario for the 
anticipated monetary prepayment was as follows. Please note that the underlined 
statements changed depending upon the conditions to which the participants were 
randomly assigned. More details for the wording of all treatment scenarios are available 
in Appendix 1. 
 
“Imagine that you go to your favorite restaurant on a Saturday night. The 
restaurant charges a $12 admission fee as it is Oktoberfest. Oktoberfest is 
an international beer festival running from late September to the first 
weekend in October. Before selecting this place, you expected the cover 
charge, so you were not surprised when you were asked to pay the 
admission fee. After you get into the restaurant, you find out that it serves 
a variety of appetizers. Please list the appetizers that you would like to 
order on the next page.” 
 
Individuals in the no-treatment control condition read the following scenario: 
 
“Imagine that you go to your favorite restaurant on a Saturday night in 
Oktoberfest. Oktoberfest is an international beer festival running from late 
September to the first weekend in October. After you get into the 
restaurant, you find out that it serves a variety of appetizers. Please list 
the appetizers that you would like to order.” 
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After participants indicated their orders and the amount they were willing to pay, 
we measured participants’ negative feelings toward the prepayment (e.g., pain of 
payment) as the mediator. In particular, we were interested in investigating whether the 
pain of payment (Thomas et al., 2011) mediated the interaction of the type of prepayment 
and anticipation on indulgent choice. Finally, we collected responses pertaining to the 
success of the manipulation of independent variables, the level of involvement, healthy 
eating habits, gender, and the level of hunger in the experiment. 
 
2.8.3 Independent variables. 
 2.8.3.1 Prepayment currency. All participants first read a short description in 
which they were told that they went to a popular restaurant on a Saturday night. 
Prepayment currency was manipulated at three levels: money, time, and effort. The 
prepayment values were pretested to ascertain they were perceived to be equal. Under the 
monetary prepayment treatment, participants imagined that they paid a $12 admission fee 
to enter the restaurant. When the prepayment was intended to be in time currency, 
subjects imagined that they had waited in line for 50 minutes before they entered the 
restaurant. Finally, in the prepayment condition with effort, subjects were informed that 
they walked eight blocks before they entered the restaurant. 
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 2.8.3.2 Prepayment Anticipation. This factor was manipulated at two levels. 
When the prepayment anticipation was present, the scenario informed participants that 
the prepayment for the restaurant, regardless of the type, was something expected and it 
took place without any surprises. Conversely, when the prepayment was unanticipated in 
the scenario, participants were told that they were surprised because they were not 
expecting a prepayment for the restaurant. 
Besides these two independent variables, a control group was also added to the 
experiment in that we manipulated neither the prepayment nor the anticipation of 
prepayment. This control condition allowed us to investigate the significant role of 
prepayment, irrespective of type, on indulging behavior. We did this by contrasting the 
effects of prepayment treatments to those of the control condition. 
 
2.8.4 Dependent variable. In Study 1, the loss of self-control was measured via 
overspending and indulgent choices. In this study, we use an alternative method to 
measure loss of self-control (see Laran, 2010 for details). In particular, after participants 
read the prepayment scenario, they were given a minute to think about and write down 
the names of the appetizers they wanted to order at the restaurant. Two judges coded the 
responses and categorized the listed appetizer(s) by each participant into healthy/virtue 
(e.g., “salad,” “spinach dip”) or unhealthy/vice (e.g., “French fries,” “calamari”). The 
definition of vice (unhealthy) and virtue (healthy) were adopted from Khan and Dhar 
(2007). Vice was defined as “something tempting that may have fewer long-term 
benefits. It is something that you want, but at the same time feel more guilty choosing.” 
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Similarly, virtue was defined as “something that is not very tempting now, but may be 
more beneficial in the long run. It is something that you feel less guilty choosing.” Then, 
a value of zero (or one) was assigned when a given participant listed healthier than 
unhealthy appetizers. The inter-judge reliability was approximately 81% and 
inconsistencies were resolved through discussion. 
 
2.8.5 Process evidence. We present the pain of payment as the underlying 
mechanism for the effect of prepayments with different currencies on indulgent 
consumption. This construct measured the intensity of the negative feelings that 
participants experienced after they made the prepayment. In particular, we used the scale 
developed by Thomas et al. (2011) that asked participants how they felt about paying 
before entering the restaurant. The pain of payment was measured via using a nonverbal 
faces scale. Specifically, participants responded to the following question: “Different 
factors may influence how consumers feel about their service experience. How did you 
feel about the wait time {admission fee/eight blocks walk} for this restaurant?” Words in 
the brackets denote the prepayment conditions. Participants indicated their responses on a 
7-point nonverbal faces pain scale with a happy face (☺) at the lower end of the scale and 
a sad face () at the higher end of the scale. For each participant, we determined the 
intensity of the pain of payment (i.e., negative emotion experienced after payment) by 
quantifying the response to the nonverbal pain scale.  
 
2.8.6 Covariates. Similar to Study 1, we controlled for the effect of healthy 
eating habits, gender, involvement, and hunger during the survey. Of these measures, 
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healthy eating habit demonstrated the most influence and was retained in subsequent 
analyses. 
 
2.8.7 Results 
 2.8.7.1 Manipulation check. We qualified the success of the manipulation of 
independent variables with two questions at the end of the survey. First, we asked people 
in a multiple-choice question to select the amount that they paid, the time they spent, and 
the effort they made to enter the club. As expected, all subjects, except two, selected 
choices consistent with their experiment conditions. Second, we asked subjects to 
indicate to what extent the incurred prepayment was anticipated on a 7-point semantic 
differential scale (1=completely unanticipated and 7=completely anticipated). As 
expected, participants in the prepayment anticipation group rated the anticipation of the 
prepayment significantly higher than did individuals in non-anticipation condition 
(Manticipation=5.88 vs. Mnon-anticipation=2.63; F (1, 135)=28.12, p<.05). Since no one correctly 
guessed the purpose of the study, responses from a total of 136 subjects, who met the 
above criteria, were used for further analyses. 
 
 2.8.7.2 Choice of appetizers. A logistic regression analysis is used to test the 
influence of prepayment method (money vs. time vs. effort) and prepayment anticipation 
(anticipated vs. unanticipated) on the choice of unhealthy (vice) appetizers. Since the 
prepayment method included three conditions, we created two dummy variables with the 
monetary prepayment as the base level. Therefore, the logistic regression model consisted 
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of three main effects (i.e., anticipation, time, and effort dummies) and two interaction 
terms between prepayment conditions and anticipation dummy correspondingly. Our 
results indicate that the significant main effect of anticipation (Wald=9.37, p<.05) was 
qualified with two significant interactions between the effort-based prepayment and 
anticipation (Wald= 5.08, p<.05) and the time-based prepayment and anticipation (Wald= 
6.92, p<.05). Planned contrasts revealed that when prepayment was anticipated, 
participants were more willing to choose unhealthy desserts when they made monetary 
prepayment compared to time-based prepayment (75.9% vs. 57.1%; z =2.01, p<.05) and 
effort-based prepayment (75.9% vs. 51.7%; z =2.63, p<.05). The choice of appetizer(s), 
however, did not significantly differ between behavioral prepayments (z<1, p>.05). These 
findings support H3a and H3b as the indulgent consumption caused by prepayment is 
greater for anticipated monetary than anticipated non-monetary prepayment. 
Conversely, when prepayment was unanticipated, the pattern of preference for 
unhealthy appetizers reversed among prepayment conditions. More specifically, in the 
unanticipated prepayment condition, participants had a higher propensity to choose 
unhealthy appetizer(s) when they prepaid with time (57.7%) than when they prepaid with 
equivalent money (34.5%; z = 2.55, p<.05). The difference in choice shares was also 
significant when effort compared to effort-equivalent money was used as the prepayment 
method (59.3% vs. 34.5%; z = 2.68, p<.05). However, no significant difference was 
found for choice shares of unhealthy appetizers between time-based and effort-based 
prepayments (z<1, p>.05). Hence, H4a and H4b, which state that hedonic consumption as 
a result of the sunk cost effect increases when unanticipated behavioral prepayments 
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compared to unanticipated monetary prepayment occur. Choice shares for unhealthy 
appetizers are presented in Figure 6. 
To further explore the overall effect of prepayment on indulgent choice, we 
contrasted the experimental groups with the control group using independent z tests. This 
test was chosen because we wanted to compare the choice shares across experiment 
conditions. Our results confirmed that monetary prepayment, when compared to the no 
prepayment scenario, enhanced temptation only when the prepayment was anticipated. In 
particular, the choice share of unhealthy appetizer(s) for anticipated monetary 
prepayment was significantly greater than that of the control group (75.9% vs. 36.1%; 
z=3.03, p<.05). 
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Figure 6. The influence of prepayment currency and anticipation on preference for an 
unhealthy appetizer 
However, the sunk cost effect for behavioral prepayments (e.g., excessive hedonic 
consumption) did not vary significantly as a function of anticipation conditions. That is, 
the choice of unhealthy appetizer(s) for time-based (57.4%) and effort-based 
prepayments (55.4%) were both greater than that of the control group (36.1%; z=2.17, 
p<.05 and z=2.03, p<.05, correspondingly). 
 
 2.8.7.3 Process evidence. We carried out a mediated moderation analysis to 
test to what extent the pain of prepayment predicted the preference for unhealthy 
appetizer(s). This analysis included a series of regression models to examine H5, stating 
that the effect of the interaction between prepayment methods and anticipation on 
unhealthy appetizer preference was mediated by the pain of payment. We followed the 
steps outlined by Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt (2005) for the mediated moderation test. 
First, the interaction between the time prepayment dummy and prepayment anticipation 
predicted the pain of payment (F (1, 162) =14.31, p<.05), as did the interaction between 
the effort prepayment dummy and prepayment anticipation (F (1, 162) =10.95, p<.05). 
Additionally, these interactions were significant predictors of the preference for 
unhealthy appetizers (time: Wald= 5.08, p<.05; effort: Wald= 6.92, p<.05). Moreover, the 
pain of prepayment significantly influenced the preference for unhealthy appetizers 
(Wald=9.03, p<.05). However, when the pain of prepayment and the interaction of the 
prepayment dummies and anticipation simultaneously predicted the preference for 
unhealthy appetizers, the pain of prepayment remained significant (Wald=6.96, p<.05), 
while the interactions both turned insignificant (Wald<2, p>.05). These results 
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collectively indicate that the effect of the interaction of prepayment currency and 
anticipation on the preference for unhealthy appetizers is fully mediated by the pain of 
prepayment. Therefore, we support H5. 
 
2.8.8 Discussion. This study explored the role of prepayment anticipation and 
prepayment currency (e.g., money, time, or effort) on indulgent behavior. Due to 
difference in mental accounting and the distinct nature of time/effort and money, we 
demonstrated that the anticipation of prepayment was a determinant factor in establishing 
the sunk cost effect. In particular, our results indicated that the magnitude of the sunk 
cost effect for monetary prepayment depends upon the anticipation of such investment. 
More specifically, when a monetary prepayment was anticipated, people indicated a 
strong sunk cost effect as represented in the form of hedonic (unhealthy) consumption. 
Anticipation of prepayment assisted consumers in setting a budget for their spending and 
accelerated consumption toward the budgeted limit by justifying it as a license to 
consume (Khan and Dhar, 2006). Since mental accounts are largely formed for monetary 
investments (Soman, 2001) and people keep track of their money more than other 
behavioral resources, more indulgent (vice) choices were observed for prepayments made 
with money than those made with other money-equivalent behavioral resources. This 
finding is in line with the existing literature in that the magnitude of the sunk cost 
decreases from monetary to non-monetary investments (Monga and Saini, 2009; Navarro 
and Fantino, 2009). 
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However, an opposite pattern for sunk cost effects was observed when 
prepayments were unanticipated. As such, people who prepaid with money were less 
likely to yield to temptation than people who prepaid with behavioral resources that were 
comparable to that money. We attribute this observation to the notion of de-escalation of 
commitment (Heath, 1995). According to this concept, a “reverse sunk cost effect” 
occurs when an investment exceeds the mental budget limit and it is easy to be tracked. 
This finding addresses the future research inquiry set forth by Krishnamurthy and 
Prokopec (2010) indicating that “it would be worthwhile to examine the possible effects 
of exceeding the limit of a mental budget on subsequent behavior”. Although 
unanticipated monetary investments were susceptible to a de-escalation of commitment, 
behavioral investments, due to the difficulties in setting up and being traced in mental 
budgets, were immune from the de-escalation of commitment. We introduced the pain of 
prepayment as the mediator for the interactive impact of prepayment and anticipation on 
indulgent behavior. 
 
2.9 General Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Consumers encounter self-control conflicts in everyday life. As such, they need to 
choose between immediate versus delayed gratification. One of the suggested methods 
that aids self-control and impedes immediate indulgence is the use of mental accounts 
(Thaler, 1985; Heath and Soll, 1996). Mental accounting sets self-specified allowances to 
curb consumption and spending habits (Soman, 2001; Krishnamurthy and Prokopec, 
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2010). In this research, we explore certain circumstances under which mental accounting 
rules can encourage, as opposed to discourage, indulgence. More specifically, we look 
into the role of prepayment toward a consumption goal and its influence on money 
spending and food choice. Prepayment before a consumption decision occurs in 
numerous contexts and may provide justification for consuming and spending 
irrationally. 
Our findings in Study 1 suggested that when people were not primed with the 
consumption avoidance goal, those who prepaid toward the consumption goal (e.g., food 
consumption at a food festival) had a higher tendency to choose an unhealthy snack and 
overspend. Thought protocols identified the sunk cost of prepayment as the underlying 
justification to indulge. However, the anomaly in food preference and spending 
disappeared when people had access to the avoidance goals. This means that individuals 
who prepaid with the saliency of the avoidance goal were better in regulating their 
consumption and expenditures than those who prepaid without it. In addition, Study 2 
extended the notion of prepayment to currencies other than money, namely time and 
effort. Consistent with the existing literature, our findings indicated that the magnitude of 
the sunk cost effect (i.e., the irrational behavior caused by the sunk cost) decreased when 
prepayments were made with time or effort. However, we found that when the 
prepayment was unanticipated, time and effort had a bigger effect on indulgent 
consumption than money did. We associated this interesting finding to the difference 
between the mental accounting of time/effort and money. Pain of prepayment served a 
mediating role for the interactive impact of prepayment and anticipation on indulgent 
behavior. 
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2.9.1 Theoretical implications. Our findings add to the existing literature on 
mental accounting in the following ways. First, mental accounting is known to be an 
effective method to regulate behavior that has been demonstrated in the context of 
consumption and spending behavior (Thaler, 1985; Soman, 2001). Consumers who open 
a mental account are able to exercise self-control effectively in their decisions. However, 
our research indicates that the restrictive role of mental accounting on consumption and 
spending will be attenuated when consumers make a prepayment toward a consumption 
goal (e.g., $5 convenience fee to reserve a table at a restaurant). We support our argument 
for sunk cost effect with reason-based choice theory (Shafir et al., 1993) and affective 
restoration model (Tice et al., 2001). Akin to Kivetz’s (1999) proposition, we suggest that 
justification may violate mental accounting rules. We believe decision makers, upon 
making a prepayment, experience an immediate need to justify the prior investment to 
avoid considering it as wasteful. To put it differently, we find prepayment to be a 
mechanism that makes people precommit to indulge (Kivetz and Simonson, 2002). 
Additionally, while prior research suggests that sunk costs effects for time or 
effort investments do not exist (Soman, 2001) or are weaker than those for money 
investments (Navarro and Fantino, 2009), our paper confirms that these findings only 
hold when investments (i.e., in our case prepayments) are anticipated. That is, when an 
investment toward a goal is anticipated, a mental budget is adjusted such that it would 
accommodate the cost of investment. As a result, an anticipated prepayment would fit 
within the limits of the dedicated mental budget and an escalation of commitment would 
occur (Heath, 1995). However, we find that when an unanticipated prepayment takes 
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place, the direction for the magnitude of sunk cost effects for monetary and non-monetary 
investments reverses. This counterintuitive finding is based on the notion of de-escalation 
of commitment (Heath, 1995): “an investment that exceeds the mental budget limit and is 
easy to track produces a reverse sunk cost effect”. Since people keep track of their 
financial investments and consider opportunity costs of their money more readily than 
they do for non-monetary investments such as time and effort, we only found the reverse 
sunk cost effect for the monetary prepayment. Hence, an unanticipated non-monetary 
prepayment resulted in higher temptation than an equivalent unanticipated monetary 
prepayment. 
 
2.9.2 Managerial implications. The results of our study may be fruitful for 
marketers in different ways. First, despite the fast growth and significant prominence of 
social coupons (e.g., coupons in the form of online daily offers), many practitioners are 
still doubtful about the profitability of this marketing tool for business owners (Kumar 
and Rajan, 2012). The reason is that coupon sites such as Groupon and LivingSocial 
typically take away half of the coupon value as their fees and customer retention after the 
coupon redemption phase is very difficult (Sherr, 2010). As a result, a lot of small/local 
businesses recently stopped paying premium prices to social couponing websites such as 
Groupon. Our findings regarding the increase in customers’ temptation after monetary 
prepayment have imperative applications in this context. In particular, business owners 
should not merely focus on the forgone profit of promoting their services and/or products 
on social coupon websites. Rather, they should count on the potential profit margins due 
to consumers’ tendency to overspend and indulge after the coupon is redeemed. Since our 
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results suggest the pain of prepayment is the underlying mechanism that justifies 
indulgent decisions, marketers are better off to advertise coupons with high face values to 
target hedonic (vice) services. This idea, especially, is relevant to individuals with 
hyperopia who need to commit themselves to indulge (Kivetz and Simonson, 2002).  This 
suggestion seems to have started taking place in the market. For example, the average 
discount per social coupon was 53% and people, on average, prepaid $38.04 per social 
coupon in the fourth quarter of 2010. However, in the first quarter of 2011, the average 
price per social coupon reached $42.45 and most of deals were promoting luxury and 
other high end goods and services (Rueter, 2011). 
Additionally, the notion that behavioral prepayment induces temptation can be 
effectively employed in practice. Behavioral resources (e.g., time and effort) are more 
scarce and perishable than equivalent money (Mogilner and Aaker, 2009). Therefore, 
when expended, they can justify and create less guilt for indulgence (Kivetz and Zheng, 
2006). Marketers should promote their services/products as a reward with respect to time 
and/or effort consumers invested prior to the actual consumption. The immediate reward 
for behavioral prepayment may give an entitlement (“I deserve this product because I 
worked hard for it”) to select indulgent choices. For example, Burger King just recently 
launched "Whopper Lust," which was a commercial that was aired exclusively on 
Channel 111 on DirecTV. The commercial displayed a Whopper continually spinning on 
top of a flaming grill. The commercial randomly displayed prompts asking viewers to 
click a certain button on their remote control to ensure viewers were paying attention. If 
people could watch the commercial for five minutes, they got a free Whopper. After five 
minutes elapse, viewers either selected to have a free Whopper mailed to their house or 
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they continued to watch the spinning Whopper. For each additional five minutes people 
watched the commercial, they earned a free Whopper. According to Burger King’s 
advertising agency, this campaign was designed to remind consumers about the time and 
mental effort they invested to earn their coupons. Therefore, the company expected 
consumers to rush to the closest Burger King branch to redeem their coupons and, 
hopefully, spend more. 
 
 2.9.3 Directions for future research. One of the best applications for the 
findings of this research is social coupons.  A social coupon is a steep discount that is 
available in limited quantities for a limited amount of time. Consumers typically pay to 
buy a coupon that can be redeemed in future. However, the current research did not 
explore the impact of the timing of the redemption on consumers’ temptation.  This issue 
is important because some social coupons run by dates, whereas others only become 
available for redemption after a certain period. Future research should examine whether 
the framing of the time lag between the prepayment and the redemption may influence 
people’s tendency to overspend and indulge. Although, the depreciation of the cost of 
prepayment over time should intuitively attenuate the sunk cost effect (Soman, 1998), 
research on sales promotion suggests that the presence of a restriction (i.e., purchase or 
time limit) draws individuals attention to the value of the deal (Inman et al., 1997). 
Therefore, the cost of social coupon should be perceived differently for a time limit 
coupon versus a coupon that is available to consumers after a certain time.  
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Another future research opportunity is to investigate whether consumers perceive 
the post-payment any differently than prepayment. While the monetary value of the 
payment may be the same, prepayment and post-payment are conceptually distinct and 
may result in different consumption and spending behavior. From the mental accounting 
perspective (Prelec and Lowenstein, 1998), the consumption decision of individuals who 
prepay will be influenced by the sunk cost effect. Conversely, in the case of post-
payment, the consumption decision will be driven by the anticipation of payment in the 
future. Existing research shows that thoughts about a future payment decreases the 
consumption enjoyment and may assist individuals to regulate their consumption 
(Raghubir and Srivastava, 2009). For example, two consumers go to a restaurant that 
charges $10 for the valet parking. Both consumers are aware of this cost but the first 
customer pays before entering the restaurant, whereas the second person pays after 
leaving the restaurant. Based on the rationale provided in this research, the first customer 
should yield to temptation, whereas the second one should restrain from temptation. 
Future research is needed to examine this proposition. 
 
 2.9.4 Limitations. The present research was not without limitations. The first 
limitation is the nature of the stimuli. This study similar to most of research in mental 
accounting entirely employed scenario-based experiments. It might be argued that the 
source of the sunk cost was artificially salient to our subjects as compared to the real 
world. While the purpose of our study was to show the sunk cost effect of prepayment 
with overspending and indulgent consumption, future research should attempt to replicate 
our findings with a field study to ensure their generalizability. The second limitation is 
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the nature of our sample. Our study employed student subjects, and to that extent, caution 
needs to be exercised in extrapolating our results to the general consumer. Finally, we did 
not consider whether time and effort were confounded in the effort manipulation for the 
second experiment. Effort was manipulated by asking people to imagine that they walk 
eight blocks to get their ID from their car. However, making this effort takes time too. 
We understand that this is not an easy issue to address and it applies to all types of effort 
manipulations in the literature (Kivetz, 2005; Monga and Saini, 2009).   
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Extra Tables 
 
Table A1: Proportion of budget allocated to debt with the smaller balance under different 
APR levels and budget limits 
 
Measure 
Smaller balance APR: 
12% 
Smaller balance APR: 
18% 
$200 $400 $600 $200 $400 $600 
Proportion of budget allocated 
to the smaller balance 
.85a .85a .87a .32b .75a .78a 
Significant differences at p<.05 among conditions are shown with dissimilar superscripts, 
a and b. Similar superscripts are insignificant at p>.05. 
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Table A2: Pretest results for vehicle package evaluation 
Measures Luxury package Technology package 
Hedonism  3.18 a -1.52 b 
Importance  5.11 a 5.46 a 
Attractiveness 4.82 a 5.30 a 
Significant differences at p<.05 among conditions are shown with dissimilar superscripts, 
a and b. Similar superscripts are insignificant at p>.05. 
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Table A3: Proportion of budget allocated to the smaller balance when the nature and the 
timing of debt vary 
 
Measure 
Hedonic debt Utilitarian debt 
Past 
consumption 
Future 
consumption 
Past 
consumption 
Future 
consumption 
Proportion of budget 
allocated to the 
smaller balance 
.77 .59* .54* .73 
Values shown by an asterisk are insignificant at p>.05. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
Table A4: Proportion of budget allocated to debt with the smaller balance under different 
types of income and number of credit cards 
 
 
 
Measure 
# credit cards:  
two 
# credit cards:  
 five 
Type of 
income: 
savings 
Type of 
income: 
windfall 
Type of 
income: 
reward-
based 
Type of 
income: 
savings 
Type of 
income: 
windfall 
Type of 
income: 
reward-
based 
Proportion of 
budget allocated 
to the smaller 
balance 
 
.60c 
 
.77b 
 
.76b 
 
.38a 
 
.43a 
 
.43a 
Significant differences at p<.05 among conditions are shown with dissimilar superscripts, 
a, b, and c. Similar superscripts are insignificant at p>.05. 
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Table A5: Pretest results for snack choices 
 Healthy snacks 
raisins celery 
sticks 
cheerios yogurt baby 
carrots 
granola bar rice cake apple 
Preference 
(1=I don’t like it at all and 
7=I like it a lot) 
5.26 a 2.11 c 4.65 b 6.20 a 4.28 b 5.14 a 3.17 c 5.83 a 
Healthiness (1=very 
unhealthy and 7=very 
healthy) 
4.82 b 6.03 a 3.02 c 5.35 b 6.01 a 5.04 b 2.66 c 6.44 a 
Estimated price 
 
$2.63 a $2.55 a $2.21 a $2.44 a $2.07 a $2.18 a $2.26 a $2.14 a 
 Unhealthy snacks 
chocolate 
bar 
Chips 
Ahoy 
cookies 
cheese 
curls 
Doritos 
chips 
ice cream doughnuts Oreos fruit roll-ups 
Preference 
(1=I don’t like it at all and 
7=I like it a lot) 
6.25 a 4.41 b 3.82 b 5.73 a 5.89 a 4.22 b 4.08 b 3.29 b 
Healthiness (1=very 
unhealthy and 7=very 
healthy) 
2.44 a 2.46 a 2.62 a 2.71 a 2.52 a 2.45 a 2.66 a 3.26 a 
Estimated price 
 
$2.68 a $3.15 a $2.96 a $3.19 a $2.92 a $3.12 a $2.88 a $3.18 a 
Significant differences at p<.05 among conditions are shown with dissimilar superscripts, a, b, and c. Similar superscripts are 
insignificant at p>.05.
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Table A6: Average amount of money people are willing to pay for their snack based on 
the existence of prepayment and consumption avoidance goal 
 
Measure 
No prepayment Prepayment 
Avoidance 
goal: absent 
Avoidance 
goal: present 
Avoidance 
goal: absent 
Avoidance 
goal: present 
Average amount of 
money people are 
willing to pay for their 
snack 
 
$2.93* 
 
$3.96* 
 
$5.06  
 
$3.40* 
Values shown by an asterisk are insignificant at p>.05. 
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Table A7: Proportion of unhealthy snacks based on the existence of prepayment and 
consumption avoidance goal 
 
Measure 
No prepayment Prepayment 
Avoidance 
goal: absent 
Avoidance 
goal: present 
Avoidance 
goal: absent 
Avoidance 
goal: present 
Proportion of 
unhealthy snacks 
 
41.90%* 
 
48.30%* 
 
85.20%  
 
36.40%* 
Values shown by an asterisk are insignificant at p>.05.
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Table A8: Proportion of health-related, sunk cost-related and pleasure-related across the 
prepayment and avoidance goal conditions 
 No prepayment Prepayment 
 
Proportion of 
health-related 
thoughts 
Avoidance goal: absent .37 a 
(n=13) 
.26 a 
(n=9) 
 
Avoidance goal: present 
.46 a 
(n=17) 
.83 b 
(n=30) 
 
Proportion of 
sunk cost-related 
thoughts 
Avoidance goal: absent .34 a 
(n=12) 
.83 b 
(n=29) 
Avoidance goal: present .26 a 
(n=9) 
.32 a 
(n=11) 
 
Proportion of 
pleasure-related 
thoughts 
Avoidance goal: absent .26 a 
(n=9) 
.31 a 
(n=11) 
Avoidance goal: present .14 a 
(n=5) 
.11 a 
(n=4) 
1: Significant differences at p<.05 among conditions are shown with dissimilar 
superscripts, a, and b. Similar superscripts are insignificant at p>.05. 
2: the number in parentheses represents the number of thoughts in each condition. 
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Table A9: Proportion of unhealthy appetizers under anticipation and different types of 
prepayment 
 
 
 
Measure 
Unanticipated prepayment Anticipated prepayment 
currency: 
Money 
currency: 
Time 
currency: 
Effort 
currency: 
Money 
currency: 
Time 
currency: 
Effort 
Proportion 
of 
unhealthy 
appetizers 
 
34.50%c 
 
57.70%a 
 
59.30%a 
 
75.90%b 
 
57.10%a 
 
51.70%a 
Significant differences at p<.05 among conditions are shown with dissimilar superscripts, 
a, b, and c. Similar superscripts are insignificant at p>.05. 
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4.2 Appendix B: Scales/Measures 
 
A) Overall knowledge of credit card terms:  participants rated the following 
attributes on a 7-point semantic scale (1=one of the least knowledgeable and 
7=one of the most knowledgeable). 
• Annual percentage rate (APR) 
• Minimum balance 
• Payment due date 
• Credit card limit 
• Outstanding balance 
 
B) Task involvement: participants rated their level of involvement with the credit 
card scenario by responding to the following items: 
• When I was reading the scenario: (1=I was not at all involved and 7=very 
involved) 
• When I was reading the scenario: (1=I was not at all interested and 7=very 
interested) 
• When I was reading the scenario: (1=I was not at all involved and 7=very 
involved) 
• When I was reading the scenario: (1=I skimmed the information quickly 
and 7= I read the information carefully) 
• When I was reading the scenario: (1=I paid little attention and 7= I paid a 
lot of attention) 
 
C) Hedonism: participant considered upgrading their vehicle with two possible 
packages, luxury and technology, for $1800. The luxury package included leather 
seats, seat warmers, and panoramic sunroof, while the technology package offered 
in-dash GPS, Tiptronic transmission, and an advanced suspension system. 
Participants rated each package separately based on the following items: 
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• (1=not functional and 7=functional) 
• (1= unnecessary and 7= necessary) 
• (1= impractical and 7= practical) 
• (1= ineffective and 7= effective) 
• (1= unhelpful and 7= helpful) 
• (1= fun and 7= not fun) 
• (1= exciting and 7= dull) 
• (1= delightful and 7= not delightful) 
• (1= thrilling and 7= not thrilling) 
• (1= enjoyable and 7= unenjoyable) 
 
D) Individuals’ motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts: all items are 
measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree and 7=very strongly 
agree). 
• If I receive a transfer balance offer from a bank, I take advantage of it to 
aggregate my debts into one account. 
• My total debt appears to be bigger when I own multiple credit cards than 
when I own only one. 
• I think I make the most progress toward debt payment when I pay off my 
credit card debt one at a time. 
• The nagging thoughts about debt payment come to my mind more 
frequently when I have multiple credit cards than when I have only one 
credit card. 
• For any given debt, I’d rather to carry the balance on one credit card 
instead of multiple credit cards. 
 
E) Healthy eating habits: participants rated their eating habits by responding to the 
following items: 
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• I watch what I eat: (1= completely disagree and 7= completely agree) 
• Eating healthy for me: (1= is not at all important and 7= very important) 
• I am: (1= not on a diet and 7= on a diet) 
• I eat: (1= less of fruits/veggies and 7= more of fruits/veggies) 
• I try to choose low-calorie foods: (1= completely disagree and 7= 
completely agree) 
 
F) Instructions for coding participants thoughts: please read the written responses 
carefully and categorize each participant’s response(s) to one (or more) of the 
following categories.  
• Health-related thoughts: the responses mainly focus on the health 
benefits associated with consumption. Participants may discuss their 
healthy eating habits and express their desire to select healthy (e.g., low 
carb, low calories) snack choices.  
• Sunk cost-related thoughts: participants account for the time, effort, or 
money spent in the food festival. Participants are aware of the monetary 
and non-monetary costs associated with their consumption decision. 
• Pleasure-related thoughts: the responses mainly focus on the pleasure 
and satisfaction derived from food consumption. Participants may describe 
their passion for and express their feelings toward a certain kind of snack. 
